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Vehicular crowdsensing (VCS) is an emerging paradigm where vehicles use onboard sensors
to collect and share data with the aim of measuring phenomena of common interest. Great at-
tention has been recently directed towards road surface condition monitoring systems (RSCMS).
Such an endeavor is of critical importance in transportation infrastructure management. As a
response, multiple recommendations have been proposed. These recommendations make use
of mobile sensing, more specifically contemporary applications and architectures that are used
in both crowdsensing and vehicle-based sensing. This has allowed for automated control as
well as analysis of road surface quality. These innovations have thus encouraged and shown the
importance of the cloud in providing reliable transport services to clients. Nonetheless, these
initiatives have not been without challenges, ranging from mobility support, location awareness,
low latency and geo-distribution. In order to address these challenges, a new term, known as
fog computing, has been coined as a novel paradigm. Therefore, this present work exploits the
advantages of VCS and fog computing paradigms in order to propose a promising framework,
which is referred to as fog-assisted vehicular crowdsensing (FVCS). Although FVCS has ad-
dressed the aforementioned challenges, it may encounter various security threats and privacy
concerns that could jeopardize public safety and become the main barrier to the acceptance of
such a new technology.
This thesis presents the proposal of a secure and privacy-preserving framework for FVCS.
The objective of the proposed framework is to allow vehicles to share their resources while pre-
serving their privacy by preventing private information from being disclosed. A thorough search
of the relevant literature suggests that the proposed framework is the first work that attempts to
address critical security and privacy challenges in FVCS. Attention is first focused on investigat-
ing the threat towards the data generated by vehicles, which is then forwarded to cloud servers
and organizations by roadside units (RSUs). The generated data can be exploited by an adversary
to reveal vehicle privacy. Protecting the privacy of participants is essential to the success of FVCS
applications. Therefore, this work presents a privacy-preserving protocol for enhancing security
in a VCS-based road surface condition monitoring system using fog computing. This protocol
presents a highly efficient certificateless aggregate signcryption scheme (CLASC). On the basis
of the proposed CLASC scheme, a data transmission protocol for monitoring road surface con-
ditions is designed with security aspects such as information confidentiality, mutual authenticity,
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integrity, privacy and anonymity. In analyzing the system, the ability of the proposed protocol to
both achieve the set objectives and exercise higher efficiency with respect to computational and
communication abilities, in comparison to existing systems, is also considered.
Furthermore, in order to revoke compromised users from the system, this work offers a novel
secure and efficient revocable privacy-preserving protocol in FVCS. The proposed protocol is
distinguished by using a binary tree structure to address scalability concerns and achieve an effi-
cient revocation function. Based on the CLASC scheme, this protocol is designed with security
properties that include report confidentiality, integrity, privacy, revocation functionality and key
escrow resilience. Extensive simulations are conducted in order to validate the proposed proto-
col. It is demonstrated that the proposed protocol achieves a much better performance than its
counterparts in terms of scalability, user revocation and signature verification.
In addition to the above countermeasures in FVCS, this work also presents an efficient dedu-
plicated reporting scheme in order to ensure that vehicles are free from security risks and privacy
threats while sharing their resources with semi-trusted nodes. The proposed scheme is charac-
terized by employing homomorphic property to provide secure computations on ciphertext. In
addition, the proposed scheme provides a promising approach for improving storage and com-
munication overheads while maintaining contents’ privacy. Specifically, RSUs as fog nodes are
able to detect and remove replicate crowdsensing reports without learning information about their
contents. Furthermore, the proposed scheme achieves fairness between vehicles whose reports
are reduplicated and deleted. Based on the CLASC scheme, this strategy is designed with secu-
rity properties such as report confidentiality, integrity, mutual authenticity, privacy, anonymity,
secure data deduplication and key escrow resilience. To conclude, this work demonstrates both
the achievement of the proposed scheme’s secure data deduplication property and its efficiency
due to low computational and communication overheads.
Moreover, attention is also given to how the present work can be further developed by ex-
ploring the important business perspective related to FVCS technology. In order to introduce
a competitive product that outperforms its competitors, this study investigates business-related
aspects such as technology management and its importance, strategic analysis, technology rec-
ommendations, technology forecasting, cost-efficient FVCS deployment and stakeholders.
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Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is an emerging paradigm that integrates sensors and embedded
computing devices to allow individuals to cooperatively collect and share data and extract infor-
mation to measure and map phenomena of common interest with the use of sensing and com-
munication technologies [35], [53]. MCS has now become a foundation for a number of sensing
applications. As an example, smart phones are able to sense the environment with several em-
bedded sensors, including a camera, global positioning system (GPS), and an accelerometer, to
generate and share sensing reports with interested organizations. With the advance of vehicular
technology, vehicular crowdsensing (VCS) extends the concept of MCS, where modern vehicles
are equipped with a massive number of sophisticated on-board sensors and powerful computa-
tional on-board units (OBUs) [36], which provide the fundamental capability and feasibility of
the VCS paradigm. It is worth indicating that MCS can support drivers by using their mobile
devices to collect and contribute data. However, mobile devices suffer from sensor limitations,
which are insufficient for providing accurate and valuable data for different applications such as
parking navigation and road surface monitoring.
VCS has been successfully adopted to enable sensing applications such as road surface condi-
tion monitoring systems (RSCMS) [64], [29], [85]. The condition of road surfaces is considered
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as a major indicator of the quality of roads. In fact, the classification of whether a road is safe or
dangerous is most commonly determined by its surface condition. Parameters such as potholes,
bumps and slipperiness are conventionally considered as the distinguishing features of the qual-
ity of road surfaces [64]. Also notable is the fact that the surface condition of roads is one of the
major causes for vehicle damage and premature aging. In Ontario (Canada), the winter climate
is known to generate weather conditions such as snow, sleet, ice and freezing rain. When acting
alongside poor roadside surface conditions, this creates situations that are potentially dangerous
to motorists, vehicles, pedestrians and properties [89]. As a result, this is an area where systems
capable of monitoring road conditions are critical to the improvement of safety in roads, the low-
ering of accident rates and protection of vehicles from damage as a result of poor surface road
conditions.
Municipalities worldwide spend millions of dollars on the maintenance and repair of road
surfaces [29]. Traditionally, municipalities engage patrol crews that perform physical exami-
nation of road surface conditions with the aim of identifying problems such as potential skid
spots and potholes. Nonetheless, with the use of advanced vehicular technologies, especially
vehicular communication combined with sensing technologies, road anomalies can be easily
identified and managed. This is achieved using an advanced system for monitoring road surface
conditions [85]. Advances in sensing technologies have already allowed the use of sensors in
gathering useful information from the environment [64], [29], [85].
The technological strides made in VCS, such as the advent of smart vehicles, have aided the
collection of information regarding the environment. For example, a vehicle embedded with on-
board sensors gathers data to measure traffic congestion on a specific road. The emphasis that
is placed on contemporary applications/architectures for both crowdsensing and vehicle-based
sensing, alongside advances in cloud computing, actually allows for data collection, analysis,
storage, processing and transmission, in an efficient manner.
Cloud-based architecture, as shown in Figure 1.1, is used by various applications such as the
smart city [59], which consists of sensors that could be embedded in a vehicle to sense and gener-
ate data that is forwarded to cloud servers via roadside units (RSUs). These on-board sensors are
used to collect data when the vehicle encounters anomalies when, for example, hitting a pothole
on the road, as displayed in Figure 1.2. The data is then transferred to a centralized cloud system




Figure 1.1: Cloud-based architecture
the integrated system remains up to date while maintaining privacy and security. RSUs as base
stations help in relaying data to the cloud for processing and to provide recommendations [84].
For any application, the approaching cars require real-time data processing in order to be able
to offer instant recommendations with regard to road surface conditions. Nonetheless, solutions
that are cloud-based and used in dealing with VCS applications present a number of issues, such
as the transmission of extensive real-time data to centralized cloud servers, which are prone to
time delays and elevated cost of bandwidth.
Furthermore, cloud servers are able to release spatial tasks. Collecting data from specific lo-
cations is based on spatial task information. Cloud servers also have the ability to recruit vehicles
to sense and generate crowdsensing reports based on the released spatial tasks [67]. In addition,
cloud servers are responsible for collecting various aspects of information about vehicles (e.g.,
locations) based on the spatial tasks, which have the unique requirements of sensing tasks and
user mobility [88]. As an example, in order to measure traffic congestion in a downtown area,
the cloud server should recruit the vehicles being driven on the roads in that area. However,
since the cloud server has no knowledge of network connections with vehicles, it is difficult to
guarantee whether the potential vehicles will receive the assigned sensing tasks and upload the
sensing reports on time. Specifically, in order to perform sensing tasks, some vehicles have to
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travel to particular locations with a certain impact on time and travel. Therefore, an efficient
solution to help improve the cloud server in terms of accuracy of task allocation and recruitment
of appropriate vehicles should be recommended.
Fog node (RSU) 
Pothole? Yes or No
Figure 1.2: An example of detected results
A computer paradigm, referred to as fog or edge computing, has recently emerged. This
computing model, which stretches cloud computing and related services to the network edge,
as presented in Figure 1.3, offers low latency, position awareness, a large node, extensive geo-
distribution, increased mobility and real-time application processes [19]. In contrast, with glob-
ally centralized cloud-based systems, once the vehicles sense and generate data, the data is then
transmitted to the closest RSU, i.e., a fog device [84]. The RSU then does real-time computations
in addition to taking local decisions, as shown in Figure 1.2. The results together with recom-
mendations can also be transmitted to other approaching vehicles heading towards the affected
region. This system thus achieves low latency as well as a reduction in bandwidth cost. Thus,
with the use of fog computing, there can be envisioned a system for measuring road surface con-
ditions. This system will allow applications to operate as reasonably as possible with the vast
amount of sensed information collected via sensors.
In addition, deploying RSUs as fog nodes helps with reducing the burden on the cloud server
as well as improving the accuracy of task allocation. In particular, rather than the cloud server
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recruiting vehicles to perform tasks, fog node RSUs can carry out the recruiting process and de-
termine the relevant vehicles to perform the task based on requirements. The cloud server firstly
assigns the spatial tasks to the connected fog nodes (e.g., RSU). The RSU, which is physically lo-
cated in the intended sensing area, can then recruit the appropriate vehicles to perform the tasks.
Therefore, the fog computing paradigm helps to minimize the overhead of the cloud server as
well as enhance the accuracy of task allocation. Moreover, RSUs act as geography-related lo-
cal servers that have complete knowledge about the vehicles in their coverage area. Motivated
by the promising features provided by VCS and fog computing, this present work proposes a
fog-assisted vehicular crowdsensing (FVCS) framework as a foundation for RSCMS. The pro-
posed FVCS framework is described in more detail in Chapter 2. The main objective of this
work is to enhance security and privacy in data transmission when vehicles outsource the task of
crowdsensing reports.




Figure 1.3: Fog-based architecture
Security and privacy issues need to be addressed before implementation in FVCS. Although
the majority of previous research studies focused on the transmission of data in vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs) [69], [50], [45], [97], [101], the security challenges related to methods of
ensuring authenticity and confidentiality regarding a reported road event are yet to be explored.
In particular, there still exist several challenges that may affect the development of RSCMS.
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The first challenge is not just the message confidentiality that needs to be addressed but also the
authenticity and integrity of transmitted messages. Furthermore, it is important to protect user-
related data, including user ID and position. Another challenge is whether the system can revoke
the compromised user where detected as being malicious. Moreover, the participants will have
definite concerns about their private information if there is a semi-trusted node involved in the
system (e.g., RSU).
In order to address these challenges, the main motivation of this study is to propose a novel
framework for privacy-preserving in order to enhance security and privacy in FVCS. The objec-
tive is to defend against various security and privacy issues in FVCS. The proposed protocols and
schemes utilize a combination of cryptographic protocols and techniques as their foundation; i.e.
they use certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), bilinear pairing, signcryption and
homomorphic encryption. Thus, they aid in protecting user privacy and satisfying the security
requirements in FVCS.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
The main objective of this research is to design a privacy-preserving framework for FVCS. This
includes a privacy-preserving protocol in data transmission for enhancing security, aiming to
fulfill confidentiality, integrity and authentication for crowdsensing reports, and ensure that par-
ticipants are free from any risk of privacy disclosure. Moreover, an efficient revocable privacy-
preserving protocol is proposed in order to achieve the security requirement, which is compro-
mised user revocation (e.g. compromised vehicle or RSU). This work concludes by proposing
an efficient deduplicated reporting scheme in FVCS to enable a semi-trusted RSU to find repli-
cated crowdsensing reports by performing homomorphic calculations on the ciphertext without
disclosing vehicle privacy. Specifically, the main contributions of this study are as follows:
• In order to form a new and promising FVCS framework, the advantages of two different
paradigms, namely VCS and fog computing, are exploited. Specifically, all the reports
generated by vehicles are processed near the end user rather than being processed in the
centralized cloud. Therefore, the proposed framework can take advantage of fog com-
puting to act as a foundation for real-time VCS applications. In considering that vehicle
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privacy may be disclosed during a report formulation and generation, this present work
proposes a novel privacy-preserving protocol for enhancing security in the FVCS [11].
At the onset, a highly efficient certificateless aggregate signcryption (CLASC) scheme is
presented. On the basis of the CLASC scheme, a privacy-preserving protocol for moni-
toring road surface conditions is designed. The proposed protocol combines CL-PKC and
signcryption technique in order to protect vehicle privacy from being disclosed during the
generating of reports. The proposed protocol is much more efficient in terms of computa-
tional cost and communication overhead compared to existing schemes [31], [51].
• An efficient revocable privacy-preserving protocol is also proposed. This protocol will en-
able the system (e.g., the key generation centre) to have the ability to revoke any detected
malicious users from the system [10]. The proposed protocol implements the revocation
technique, which takes place when a legitimate user is discovered as being malicious. This
may happen whether the user’s private key is expired or not. The proposed protocol makes
use of a combination of a binary tree structure with a certificateless signcryption technique
to ensure compromised users are revoked, thus preserving the entire system from being
breached. Specifically, the protocol protects crowdsensing reports that are processed by
RSUs from being accessed by a non-legitimate user (e.g., compromised RSU). Extensive
simulations demonstrate efficiency with regard to the computational cost and ciphertext
size of the proposed protocol. In terms of scalability, compromised user revocation, sig-
nature verification process and key escrow problem evasion, the proposed protocol outper-
forms existing competing schemes [98], [68], [92].
• Inspired by the fact that there are inevitably some duplicates in the crowdsensing reports
generated by vehicles at the same location, and that gateways as RSUs may be corrupted,
an efficient deduplicated reporting scheme in FVCS [9] is designed in order to address
these challenges. The proposed scheme integrates a homomorphic concept with a sign-
cryption technique to allow the semi-trusted gateways to process and analyze encrypted
crowdsensing reports. The proposed scheme also supports the deduplication process on
the reports without revealing any sensitive information related to the participating vehi-
cles. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is much more efficient and guarantees fairness
between vehicles whose reports are reduplicated and deleted. A detailed performance anal-
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ysis demonstrates the achievement of secure data deduplication property and efficiency in
terms of computational cost, communication overhead and bandwidth overhead.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. An overview of vehicular crowdsensing (VCS) and fog
computing, associated with FVCS security and privacy issues, applied cryptography to FVCS
and related work are introduced in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, a privacy-preserving protocol for
enhancing security in the FVCS is presented, followed by security analysis and performance
evaluation. Chapter 4 introduces a revocable privacy-preserving protocol against compromised
users in FVCS and provides a security analysis and performance evaluation. In Chapter 5, an
efficient deduplicated reporting scheme in FVCS is described, followed by security analysis and
performance evaluation. Finally, conclusions and future work are described in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 An Overview of Vehicular Crowdsensing
Recently, a new business model has been made aware of the scientific community regarding the
sensing phenomenon, referred to as crowdsensing paradigm (also referred to as mobile crowd-
sensing MCS) [71]. It allows a massive number of mobile sensors to be used for exchanging
information. Moreover, the applications of MCS may further benefit and enable our society. In
other words, it indicates to the sharing of sensor data to measure a community phenomenon. For
instance, a large group of individuals may have mobile devices capable of sensing and computing
such as smartphones. These devices are able to measure, map, analyze or predict any processes
of common interest by sharing data and extracting information. In terms of MCS applications,
they are particularly attractive to organizations because they can provide them valuable data
without the need to make significant investments. However, mobile devices suffer from sensor
limitations, which are insufficient for providing valuable data for different applications such as
parking navigation and road surface monitoring. Therefore, MCS is a very charming solution for
organizations to collect important data in terms of an intelligent transportation system (ITS). In
this study, we consider RSCMS as the application scenario we have implemented to investigate
from different perspectives including efficiency, accuracy, security and privacy.
VCS paradigm has attracted more and more attention in recent years, which can help com-
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panies, data analysts or communities to collect and share large amounts of data with the aim of
measuring phenomena of common interest. Modern vehicles are also equipped with on-board
sensors and wireless communication devices, such as cameras, GPS, acceleration sensors, and
OBUs [54], [44]. The essential capability of VCS is provided by the equipped sensors and de-
vices. Vehicles can periodically report the driving information (e.g., location, real-time speed,
and driving video) and also provide traffic conditions, road conditions, and weather conditions
for transportation planning, road system design, traffic signal control, and so on [64], [29], [85].
Recently, the design of vehicular communication and sensing has been growing. A majority of
some applications, such as traffic monitoring, transportation management and data collection,
requires the vehicle to act as a sensor. It mainly relies on the sensing capabilities of vehicles
and the communication channels. For example, a camera could be embedded to a vehicle to do
traffic monitoring, and then transmit the captured data to a control center for further processing.
Obviously, vehicles equipped with various sensors have become ubiquitous. These sensors could
be utilized to measure; noise via the microphone, movement via the accelerometer and location
via GPS [44]. Therefore, these sensors can collect vast quantities of data that may be useful in
a variety of ways. For example, locating potholes on the roads in cities by processing GPS and
accelerometer data. In order to adopt and implement VCS applications, a promising computing
network infrastructure should be provided.
2.2 Network Infrastructure
An efficient network infrastructure is significantly needed to implement large-scale applications,
i.e., RSCMS. In this system, smart vehicles are equipped with various sensors such as accelerom-
eter and GPS. Thus, these vehicles deal with massive amounts of generated data. In the appli-
cation scenario, the approaching vehicles require real-time data processing in order to be able
to offer instant recommendations with regard to the road surface conditions. A network infras-
tructure that can efficiently handle such large volume of real-time data is essential. In parallel
to these developments, cloud computing as a network infrastructure has experienced significant
improvements in recent years in terms of both coverage and performance [79]. It allows trans-
mitting, storing, and processing large amounts of data in an efficient manner. However, adopting
cloud-based solutions to use in VCS applications presents a number of issues. Latency and a
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high cost of bandwidth are the potential challenges to centralized cloud servers during receiving
extensive real-time data. Furthermore, the accuracy of assigning spatial tasks by a cloud server
has a burden of its direct knowledge of network connections in terms of recruiting proper ve-
hicles located at specific location regarding spatial task information. Therefore, fog computing
paradigm has been adopted in order to address the aforementioned challenges.
2.3 An Overview of Fog Computing
The explosive growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) brought millions of devices and sensors
connected to the Internet [32]. These devices and sensors are generating more data every day.
Moving all that data to a central data center, i.e., cloud for analysis presents latency, bandwidth,
security, and reliability challenges. Actually, there are several emerging IoT applications such as
industrial automation, transportation, and networks of sensors. These applications demand real-
time processing or risk a longer time delay. Hence, fog computing has been introduced to support
these IoT applications on billions of connected devices to run directly at the network edge [23].
It is a generic platform for edge computing and focuses on the localized service applications and
computational requests. Many IoT applications require both fog localization and cloud global-
ization for analytics and big data. This new distributed computing allows applications to run as
close as possible to large quantities of sensed data. Thus, fog computing can manage big data
more efficiently. Also, fog data services run directly on the network edge. The first goal of these
services is to convert raw data generated from sensors into smooth information, i.e., sensitive or
insensitive data. While insensitive data can travel to the cloud for long term storage and further
historical analysis, sensitive data is stored and analyzed at the network edge. The second goal
of these services is to filter data based on metadata, aggregation and detection of events, and
efficient encryption of plaintext sensor data.
2.3.1 Networking Architecture
Fog networking is a new architecture that provides storage, communication, control, configu-
ration, measurement and management between terminal devices and the Internet with features,
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including location awareness, geographic distribution and low response latency [84], [19]. In
fog networking, a huge number of decentralized mobile devices or vehicles can self-organize to
communicate and potentially collaborate with each other via a fog node located at the edge of the
Internet. There are several dimensions in fog architecture in terms of the current standard prac-
tice [21]. The essential data is stored near the end user rather than being stored in data centers.
Moreover, instead of all traffic routed through the backbone network, fog performs a substantial
amount of communication at or near the end-user. Furthermore, a fundamental amount of man-
agement, including network measurement, control and configuration, at or near the end-user is
carried out. Each node in the fog network must be able to act as a router for its neighbors and be
flexible to node mobility. More precisely, data collected by sensors are sent to devices like net-
work edge, routers, access point for processing, and not sent to cloud server thus fog computing
paradigm reduces bandwidth traffic issues. Also, fog computing improves the quality of service
and minimizes latency. Therefore, fog computing plays an important role by reducing the traffic
of data to the cloud and not delaying the computation and communication due to its placement
near the data source.
2.3.2 Fog Computing Features
The fog computing paradigm provides a number of features that make the fog is a significant
extension of the cloud.
• Low latency and location awareness. Applications with low latency requirements such as
RSCMS can be supported by the fog at the network edge. In order to fulfill better latency,
fog provides the computation close to the vehicles who sense and generate the data.
• Widespread geo-distribution. In contrast to the centralized cloud, fog is widely dis-
tributed. For instance, fog will play a significant role in delivering high quality streaming
to connected vehicles through proxies such as RSUs positioned close to each other.
• Large-scale. Because of the wide geo-distribution, there could be numerous fog nodes in
a local region such as a city. These fog nodes have the possibility to collaborate between
each other to provide fog services to different end users.
12
• Mobility. Fog supports this promising feature that each fog-based application can imme-
diately interact with its nodes, i.e., vehicles during moving.
• Real-time application processing. Fog-based applications (e.g., RSCMS) require real-
time interaction for fast and sophisticated services. While patch processing is a helpful
characteristic that cloud computing paradigm provides, fog computing supports an efficient
way by processing real-time data.
2.4 FVCS Architecture
FVCS architecture inherits the advantages of VCS and fog computing paradigms. They are in-
tegrated together to form the new proposed framework that has unique characteristics, including
real-time processing, location awareness, geo-distribution, and communication efficiency. RSUs
as fog nodes are upgraded to have computational capabilities and storage spaces for offering
computational and storage services to vehicles. Furthermore, they act as geography-related local
servers to recruit a set of mobile users to perform the tasks. Therefore, RSUs as fog nodes are
much powerful than RSUs in the conventional VANET, which is considered as a self-organized
network to facilitate inter-vehicle communications, vehicle-to-roadside communications, and the
Internet access with relay by RSUs. The proposed framework reduces the overhead of the cloud
servers and also improves the accuracy of task allocation. FVCS is mainly composed of an
organization, vehicles, RSUs as fog nodes and cloud servers.
• Organization: An organization releases their vehicular crowdsensing tasks on the cloud
server in order to help perform these tasks because the organization does not have sufficient
resources to accomplish these tasks individually.
• Vehicles: Each vehicle is equipped with various sensors and a powerful OBU. It can com-
municate with nearby vehicles and fog RSUs. The computations are performed by the
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of fog-assisted vehicular crowdsensing
• RSUs as fog nodes: RSUs are placed on the edge of the network and close to end users.
Specifically, they are deployed along the road-side or at critical points. Therefore, they
have complete knowledge about the vehicles in their coverage area and one-hop connection
with these vehicles. Unlike RSUs in traditional VANETs, RSUs as fog nodes are equipped
with storage space, computational and communication devices.
• Cloud servers: They have enormous capabilities for storage and computational, which can
provide various services to the entire system. They communicate with an organization such
as an insurance company for releasing spatial crowdsensing tasks and delivering results as
well. Hence, deploying RSUs as fog nodes helps reducing the burden on the cloud server
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and performing the computations at the edge. RSUs also send the results to the cloud
and the registered vehicles. Therefore, the collaboration between cloud and fog avoids
sending all the data generated by vehicles to the cloud for processing, and thus achieves
low bandwidth and better latency.
As shown in Figure 2.1, cloud, fog and vehicle layers have formed the architecture of FVCS.
These layers cooperate with each other within the FVCS framework.
In the vehicle layer, vehicles can perform the tasks using its own mobile devices with capa-
bilities of data sensing, processing and communications. In fact, the vehicles can collect road
condition information from their on-board sensors during driving and then submit their crowd-
sensing reports to the local RSUs.
In the fog layer, RSUs are responsible to recruit a set of vehicles to perform the tasks. They
use short range communication devices to communicate with the driving-through vehicles in their
coverage regions. Thus, RSUs collect and process crowdsensing reports outsourced by vehicles.
In addition, they distribute the results to the registered vehicles and the cloud. In particular, RSUs
perform computations and make decisions close to the end users.
In the cloud layer, when the organization releases spatial crowdsensing tasks on a cloud
server, the cloud server then assigns these tasks to fog nodes RSUs based on the spatial infor-
mation of tasks, e.g., the sensing areas. For example, to measure the traffic congestion in the
downtown area, the cloud server should assign the fog nodes locating in the downtown area. In
addition, the cloud can receive the results from the RSUs as historic information to be utilized
later via the organization. Furthermore, the organization can collect generated data by vehicles
from the cloud that is capable to analyze certain data collected by RSUs.
In this thesis, we focus our attention to enhancing security and privacy in data transmission
where vehicles generate crowdsensing reports in the proposed framework. Meanwhile, we as-
sume that the spatial tasks are protected since there have been many studies concerning security
and privacy for spatial tasks assignments either in cloud-based or fog-based [63], [4], [6], [5].
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2.5 FVCS Applications
Since modern vehicles are equipped with sophisticated sensors and on-board units (OBUs), VCS
increasingly becomes targeted and ideal for several applications. There are some applications
using MCS-based via supporting drivers to collect and contribute data using sensing and com-
puting mobile devices (i.e. smartphones) such as Google maps and Waze. Nevertheless, the data
obtained from mobile device sensors are not accurate enough to estimate the road condition due
to sensing capability limitations in mobile devices [82]. In addition, MCS-based is prone to a
high cost of bandwidth and time delay issues. Therefore, the sensing capabilities in smart vehi-
cles can improve generating accurate and efficient data to assess the road and traffic condition.
Meanwhile, deploying RSUs as fog nodes helps to tackle the cloud drawbacks. Motivated by the
various applications found in current literature [64], [29], [85], we consider that the safety-related
application RSCMS is the application scenario we integrate into our proposed FVCS framework.
In RSCMS, the detection of road surface abnormalities (e.g., potholes, bumps, ice) and their
locations contribute to the improvement of road conditions and drivers’ safety. Road quality
assessment has been identified as an important issue related to the possibility of making drivers
and passengers more comfortable and safe more efficiently. The presence of road damage or
abnormalities also worsens the energy efficiency of vehicles during driving since it determines
an increase in fuel and consumption of vehicles’ components, especially brakes and suspensions.
The sensing devices equipped on vehicles such as GPS, accelerometer, and camera offer the
possibility of obtaining real-time information about road features. Thus, the vehicles can upload
road condition reports to fog nodes. Then, the organizations (e.g., transportation agencies or
municipalities) can query the road surface abnormalities in the region of their jurisdiction to the
cloud, which can automatically recognize the road problems for prioritizing road repair according
to the data and results provided by fog nodes located in that region. Despite the proposed FVCS
is a promising solution as an infrastructure for adopting real-time application in VCS, the public
may not accept our proposed framework and threaten themselves if it lacks security measures to
ensure privacy, integrity, and authenticity of the data they contribute.
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2.6 FVCS Security and Privacy Challenges
Obviously, the objective of developing RSCMS on the basis of FVCS is to improve road quality
and safety, e.g., reducing accident rates and protection vehicles from getting damaged. Neverthe-
less, the design of FVCS applications brings many challenges in terms of security and privacy.
In fact, security and privacy in FVCS applications should be considered as important as securing
other networks in computing. Because of the unique features of the VCS networks, such as high
mobility and an extremely large amount of network entities (i.e., the vehicles and RSUs), the
issues on security and privacy in FVCS applications become more challenging. Indeed, autho-
rized users and adversaries may exist in the same environment and share the same privileges.
Consequently, the utilization of these privileges such as accessing to confidential data or even
tampering with integrity of data can be exploited by adversaries for further malicious intentions,
and fatal to other users. However, the vehicle owners concern about their private information
such as identity and location. Also, they may not trust the reports transmitted from another vehi-
cle. Thus, they may not be willing to participate and contribute in FVCS applications while there
is no guarantee for protecting their private data. Hence, solving security and privacy challenges
in FVCS applications has top priroty and is necessary for any vehicle to participate. To be more
precise, there are a number of possible security and privacy attacks in FVCS. These are discussed
in a detail as follows:
• Personal information leakage.
In the FVCS applications (e.g. RSCMS), a malicious vehicle may be interested in the
road event reports that might have sensitive information generated by other vehicles. Con-
sequently, we take this potential attack into account as disclosing the source of private
information. For instance, during a vehicle journey, it records a road event report, which
could include important information about the vehicles or the report itself, and then sends
it to the local RSU. Therefore, a malicious vehicle is able to eavesdrop on the reports and
reveals the confidentiality of the data such as vehicle’s sensitive information. Moreover,
malicious RSU can easily reveal the sensitive information of reports generated by vehicles.
In addition, vehicle’s identity and location are a major critical issue in terms of the privacy
protection [49]. In fact, the majority of VCS applications needs vehicles identity and loca-
tion that can be easily disclosed by an attacker. To be more precise, the generated reports
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from the surrounding environment may be related to some aspects of the drivers or even
passengers and their social setting. For example, where drivers usually go, head, visit, or
which activity they prefer to do in vehicles. As a result, these reports have to be encrypted
in order to protect the sensitive information and thus address these possible issues.
• Report modification attack.
A road event report can be forged by an attacker who modifies the report and forwards it to
the RSU. This crucial attack may cause damages; for example, neither malicious vehicle
nor RSU may fabricate the reports during report transmission. If the RSU accepts forged
reports generated by malicious vehicles, it then performs computations on these reports
and thus provides false results to the entire network. Therefore, integrity and mutual au-
thentication should be achieved. Thus, only the original messages from legitimate users
are accepted and the receiver can verify the sender’s report. This insures that the sensitive
information has not been modified by an unauthorized user.
• Impersonation attack.
The adversary may pretend to be another vehicle or even an RSU to deceive the others by
sending bogus information to meet his own purpose. In order to address this attack, mutual
authentication property should be implemented and achieved between system participants
in the FVCS application.
Therefore, in order to tackle the aforementioned challenges, a set of novel and promising
mechanisms for achieving security and privacy in the FVCS applications is developed. Specifi-
cally, cryptography techniques can be used to achieve security requirements including confiden-
tiality, authentication, integrity, and privacy.
2.7 Applied Cryptography to FVCS
In this section, an overview of various cryptographic techniques most used in many technologies
and academic works for FVCS are provided. Due to the features of FVCS, several security and
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privacy issues have been emerging in this framework. For instance, the proposed framework of-
fers services such as widespread geo-distribution, scalability and mobility to a massive number of
vehicles. Thus, this may lead to critical issues in terms of authentication and protecting vehicles
privacy during data transmission. In fact, we exploit the advantage of using some certain cryp-
tographic techniques such as CL-PKC, symmetric/asymmetric, signcryption and homomorphic
encryption to guarantee that the data traffic through the system is secure and achieves privacy
preservation. These techniques are used in this study, and thier basic concepts are introduced in
more detail later.
2.7.1 Certificatless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC)
The deployment and management of infrastructure is significant to support the authenticity of
cryptographic keys. Therefore, there is a need to provide an assurance to the user about the
relationship between a public key and the identity of the holder of the corresponding private
key. This assurance is carried out in a traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) especially
in the form of certificate that is used to prove the ownership of a public key by a certification
authority (CA) [1]. However, there are issues associated with certificate management, including
revocation, storage, distribution and the computational cost of certificate verification. These are
particularly acute in computational or bandwidth limited environments [24].
Identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) was first proposed by Shamir [78] who
improved the way of authenticity of keys in PKI. In ID-PKC, each user uses his identity as the
public key while his private key will be generated by a trusted third party such as private key
generator (PKG). The first fully practical and secure ID-PKC encryption scheme was presented
by Boneh et al. [17] by using elliptic curves with bilinear pairings. However, the dependence on
a PKG to generate private keys introduces a key escrow inherent problem. For instance, if the
PKG is compromised, it can access any ciphertext generated by any user in the system.
In order to address these issues, Alriyami et al. [3] introduced a new paradigm for public key
cryptography, which is CL-PKC. It solves the key escrow problem in ID-PKC while maintaining
its good certificate free property. Ordinarily, a key generation centre (KGC) is given complete
control and implicitly trusted to generate the keys. The key generation process is divided between
the KGC and a user in order to prevent a complete breakdown of the system in the case of KGC
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being compromised. The private key has two parts; one is the partial private key generated by
the KGC; the second part of the key is a random secret value generated by the user and is never
revealed to anyone, including the KGC.
2.7.2 Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptosystems
A cryptosystem is a pair of algorithms that take a number of keys in order to convert plaintext
to ciphertext [83]. These keys are called encryption keys. In particular, the system that uses the
same cryptographic key for both encryption of plaintext and decryption of ciphertext is referred
to as symmetric key cryptography. On the other hand, the system that uses different keys for
encryption and decryption is referred to as a public key or asymmetric cryptosystem. Menezes et
al. [56] have well studied the pros and cons of each of these cryptosystems. Extensive compar-
isons in terms of key length, hash function, digital signature and computational performance are
provided in [56]. In the literature, asymmetric and symmetric cryptosystems methods have not
widely been used in VCS. Therefore, on the base of those cryptosystems, we design secure and
privacy-preserving mechanisms in FVCS with a variety of security purposes, e.g., authentication,
confidentality, batch verification and privacy-preserving techniques.
2.7.3 Signcryption Technique
A signature and encryption approach is a conventional way to guarantee the confidentiality and
integrity of a message [7]. In particular, this approach is digitally signing a message and then
encrypting it. This approach is done in two steps. However, the main disadvantage of signature
and encryption approach is that the cost involved is the sum of the signing the message added to
the cost of encrypting it. It consumes more machine cycles and bloats the message by introducing
extended bits to it. Hence, decrypting and verifying the message at the receiver side could spend
a large amount of computational power [7].
In order to address this issue, a promising paradigm in the public key cryptography named
signcryption technique [100] has been introduced. It simultaneously fulfills both the functions
of digital signature and public key encryption in a logically single step. Although the signcryp-
tion technique performs the signature and encryption simultaneously, the computational costs
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and communication overhead are much lower compared to the signature and encryption ap-
proach [7]. Multiple CL-PKC schemes have been proposed and exploited the advantage of sign-
cryption technique [8], [93], [95], [46]. Therefore, based on this promising technique, we build
our certificateless aggregate signcryption (CLASC) scheme.
2.7.4 Homomorphic Encryption Technique
Homomorphic encryption is used to perform arithmetic computations on ciphertexts without
knowing the private key (without decryption) and generate a new encrypted result. When the
ciphertext is decrypted, the result will give the same result when doing arithmetic on a plain-
text [87]. The purpose of using the homomorphic encryption technique in this work is to help
facilitating the analysis and detecting of the replicated data among the encrypted messages. For
example, given n vehicles and their encrypted crowdsensing reports (CSR1, ....CSRn) where
CSR1 denotes encrypted crowdsensing report of vehicle 1 and so on. As a result, we can detect
a set of users who have the same crowdsensing report while they are encrypted.
In this work, the homomorphic concept and signcryption technique are integrated based on
CL-PKC to achieve an efficient privacy-preserving mechanism in order to protect the system
from any security threats and privacy risks.
2.8 Related Work
Extensive studies have been conducted to address the challenges caused by poor surface road
conditions, and tackle security and privacy issues in FVCS. This section provides a brief review
according to the existing systems for RSCMS and the most recent privacy-preserving schemes
with respect to CLASC. Furthermore, we investigate the applied cryptographic approaches (e.g.,
compromised user revocation and secure deduplication) that are part of this work.
21
2.8.1 Road Surface Condition Monitoring System
Modern devices especially mobile devices have made sensing capabilities possible through the
use of multiple powerful embedded sensors including accelerometers, gyroscopes and GPS sys-
tems, among others. We thus evaluate multiple scenarios/applications where mobile sensors are
used in detection and reporting road surface conditions.
Eriksson et al. proposed Pothole Patrol (P2) [29], a mobile sensing application used in de-
tection and reporting of road surface condition. In this system, they used a taxi cabinet in which
multiple accelerometer sensors were placed and used in the collection of multiple predefined pat-
terns associated with road surface anomalies via manual labelling. In the experiment, Eriksson
et al. equipped taxis with an embedded Linux computer system and were able to detect more
than 90% of potholes.
In a similar system used in traffic sensing and communication, Mohan et al. [61] proposed
Nericell that can detect and report road conditions using the built-in sensors (e.g., accelerometers,
GPS) in mobile phones. The information was further collected into traffic maps to be shared by
the public.
Further, Mednis et al. [55] improved on the P2 system using a customized embedded gadget
and extended the approach using vehicular sensor networks. It is operated using wireless sensor
networks with the help of smartphones hardware platform for sensing road surface conditions
[85]. Specifically, they have proposed CarMote that is a promising road monitoring platform.
For instance, accelerometer and camera sensors are used for capturing photos and videos that
further analyzed to extract road features.
Although these RSCMS MCS-based help provide promising solutions to enhance the road
quality and safety, MCS-based still has critical challenges in terms of collecting accurate data
about the roads. Specifically, mobile devices do not have high powerful computation and also
suffer from sensor limitations such as finding nails on the roads. Furthermore, a majority of those
RSCMS is designed based on cloud computing architecture. Therefore, in order to address these
challenges and being different from the above works, VCS and fog computing paradigms are
integrated to propose an efficient and novel FVCS framework to be a foundation for RSCMS.
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2.8.2 Certificateless Aggregate Signcryption Schemes
In the proposed framework, we design various privacy-preserving schemes based on CL-PKC.
Furthermore, we utilize a signcryption technique in order to fulfill confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity simultaneously, which presents high efficiency in terms of computational cost and
communication overhead. The proposed privacy-preserving schemes mainly rely on the aggre-
gation signcryption technique. The concept of signcryption technique was first introduced by
Zheng [100]. On the other hand, Boneh et al. [18] proposed the aggregation concept, which
is a digital signature scheme. To be more precise, the focus of this work will be on existing
certificateless aggregate signcryption schemes literature.
Certificateless public key cryptography was first proposed by Al-Ryiami and Paterson [3]
as a way of overcoming the challenges associated with key escrow as applied in cryptography
approaches that are identity-based. In particular, the private key is divided into two parts. One
is generated by the trusted third party in the form of a partial private key while the second part
is computed by a user himself in the form of a secret value. These two parts totally create the
full private key for the user. There are several schemes proposed in encryption [77], [25], digital
signature [40], [41], and signcryption [8], [93], [95], [46], certificateless cryptography.
Since we are using certificateless aggregate signcryption, we first evaluate multiple aggregate
signcryption as used in identity-based aggregate schemes of signcryption [75], [43]. However,
these schemes have security issue which is a key escrow problem. In order to solve this problem,
Lu et al. [51] and Eslami et al. [31] are the only works focusing on designing certificateless
aggregate signcryption in the literature. They argued in favour of CLASC as a secure system.
CLASC is emphasized in [51] as an appropriate secure model as has been proven in its use in the
random oracle model [14].
Nonetheless, the scheme as currently constituted requires significant improvements over pair-
ing maps that can potentially lead to a promising low computational scheme in addition to low-
ering time consumption. Therefore, we propose a new and efficient CLASC scheme by building
on the random oracle model [14].
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2.8.3 Compromised User Revocation
This subsection begins by investigating some of the existing VANETs revocation schemes, revo-
cation in public key cryptosystem and revocation in CL-PKC setting.
Revocation in VANETs
The family of standards IEEE 1609 describes the use of a PKI in VANETs. Jean et al. [42]
analyzed a proposal for the use of a PKI to protect messages and mutually authenticate entities
in VANETs. Lin et al. [48] investigated some certificate revocation protocols introduced in the
traditional PKI architecture. They concluded that the most commonly adopted certificate revo-
cation scheme is through certificate revocation list (CRL), using central repositories prepared
in certificate authorities (CAs). Based on such centralized architecture, alternative solutions to
CRL could be used for certificate revocation system like certificate revocation tree (CRT) and the
online certificate status protocol (OCSP) where the common requirements for these schemes is
high availability of the centralized CAs. Frequent data transmission with OBUs to obtain timely
revocation information may cause significant overhead. Thus, with the high-speed mobility and
extremely large amount of network entities in FVCS, the centralized CRL architecture may be
far from realistic.
To tackle the problem, Raya et al. [69] discussed the current methods of revocation and its
weaknesses, and proposed a novel protocol for certificate revocation, including CRL, revocation
using compressed certificate revocation lists (RC2RL), revocation of the tamper proof device
(RTPD) and distributed revocation protocol (DRP), stating the differences among them. They
also made a simulation on the DRP protocol concluding that the DRP protocol is the most con-
venient one which used the bloom filter. Also, Jason et al. [38] proposed the use of Bloom filter
to store the revoked certificate, and dedicate the CRL just to sign the revocation key for each
vehicle. Using bloom filter will increase the speed for searching in it while it is a probabilistic
function, and may give wrong information. For example, the certificate may be in the list, and the
result shows that it is not in the list. Zhang et al. [98] and Wang et al. [92] proposed the efficient
privacy-preserving protocols involved with CRL methods, however they still use the idea of CRL
that leads to high computational overhead and is not suitable for implementing in FVCS.
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In order to solve the problem caused by the management of valid public-key certificates, we
propose a revocable privacy-preserving protocol CL-PKC-based.
2.8.3.1 Revocation in public key cryptosystem
The revocation mechanism is significantly needed in order to revoke the malicious users from
the system. The revocation problem is resolved in PKI [2], [28] by using CRL and OCSP [62].
PKI uses a certificate to bind a public key with its user identity [27], [72]. However, the issues
associated with certificate management are complicated and expensive. The certificate based PKI
management suffers from long computational delay in the RCL checking in case of applying to
a scalable environment, i.e., VCS applications. To get rid of the complex and costly certificate
management problem in the traditional PKI, ID-PKC effectively uses a user identity information
as its public key [78]. Boneh and Franklin [17] suggested a method that the PKG generates
private keys for all non-revoked users periodically. Boldyreva et al. [16] utilized a binary tree to
present the first scalable revocable identity-based encryption scheme, which was later improved
by Libert and Vergnaud [47]. Many ID-PKC revocation schemes [76], [94] are proposed, but
these schemes have an inherent problem of key escrow. Alriyami et al. [3] introduced CL-PKC
that solves the key escrow problem in ID-PKC while remaining its good certificate free property.
2.8.3.2 Revocation in CL-PKC setting
Up to now, one of the available solutions to revocation in CL-PKC is to employ an online
trusted third party that is different from Key Generator Center (KGC), called Security Media-
tor (SEM) [22], [96]. The KGC divides a user partial private key into two components. One
component is sent to the user while the other is delivered to the SEM. Both communications
require secure channels. A user cannot perform decryption or signing without the online help of
the SEM. To revoke a compromised user, the SEM just simply stops supplying online help for
that user. However, this inevitably increases the complexity of the system and makes the system
inconvenient for practical applications. Another serious drawback of the revocation mechanism
using SEM lies in the fact that the SEM must keep a large amount of secret key component
of users. This not only brings a heavy burden to the SEM but also introduces a bottle neck
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for attackers to compromise. Another existing revocation mechanism is to require the KGC to
generate users’ partial private keys at predetermined regular time periods [80], [90], [86]. To
revoke a user, the KGC just stops sending fresh partial private keys of a new time period for that
user. In the proposed protocol, the KGC is in charge to produce users’ partial private keys at
predetermined time periods.
2.8.4 Secure Deduplication
In terms of secure deduplication, extensive studies have been conducted recently under the con-
sideration of cloud storage environments not specific to fog storage environments. Several secure
deduplication schemes [99], [39] have been proposed under the assumption that the servers are
fully-trusted. In particular, the end users outsource plaintext reports that the server-side performs
the data deduplication on these reports. There is a crucial challenge in case the server-side is
considered as a semi-trusted, so that the end users have concerns about their private information
from being disclosed. In order to address this issue, Douceur et al. [26] proposed convergent
encryption (CE) to provide data confidentiality in deduplication. In this study, users derive a
convergent key K from each original data copy M and encrypt the data copy with K to get the
ciphertext C. Also, they derive a tag for the data copy such that tag will be used to detect du-
plicates. Following this concept of deterministic key derivation from the data itself, Bellare et
al. [13] presented a generalized framework, called message-locked encryption (MLE). MLE is
categorized into four particular schemes and assessed accurately according to levels of integrity
and security guarantees. These schemes have addressed duplicate-faking attacks for space effi-
cient secure outsourced storage.
One supposed scenario of the proposed framework scenarios is in case that RSUs are con-
sidered as semi-trusted. Therefore, the privacy concerns about vehicles private information is
taking into account to provide a secure and efficient way to manage replicated contents without
learning any information about vehicles. We exploit the advantage of fog computing to improve
efficiency and latency, and CE to support deduplication feature in the ciphertexts. The proposed
scheme is a hybrid scheme including secure deduplication and signcryption techniques. Since
we adopt CE in our work, we do not consider the local brute force attack because Bellare et
al. [12] proposed dupLESS that prevents this kind of attack and offered a secure, easily-deployed
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solution for efficient outsourced storage supporting data deduplication. To the best of our knowl-
edge and different from the existing works, we propose a first deduplicated reporting scheme
based on the CLASC to delete the repeated data without scarifying the confidentiality, integrity
and authenticity of the reports.
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Chapter 3
A Privacy-Preserving Protocol for
Fog-Assisted Vehicular Crowdsensing
3.1 Introduction
Although road surface condition information is seen as a useful system in transportation infras-
tructure, security and privacy issues need to be addressed before its implementation into FVCS.
In reality, crowdsensing report transmissions experience major challenges due to the privacy sen-
sitivity of road event information, as well as the unauthentic interconnection of vehicles and the
corresponding road infrastructure, including RSUs. A number of issues need to be addressed in
the design of a security protocol, including a guarantee that a road event report is not accessed at
the time of transmission by unauthenticated users as well as consideration for its scalability. It is
supposed that the generated reports remain encrypted, hence the system should not only be able
to verify but also to simultaneously decrypt reports while providing low computational and com-
munication costs. Additionally, the protocol should attain mutual authentication among vehicles
and RSUs. Further, the protocol should be lightweight as a result of constraints due to the dy-
namic nature of VCS. The protocol also needs to retain its robustness when there is a threat; for
instance, in a case where the authentication keys remain exposed. Furthermore, a key generation
center (KGC) may be represented by a commercial organization that can naturally misbehave by
illegally collecting and accessing vehicle sensitive information. Thus, a KGC cannot be fully
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trusted to generate the users’ private keys.
In order to successfully address the aforementioned issues, CL-PKC [3] is used in pursu-
ing the security objectives. CL-PKC avoids the often experienced key escrow problem that is
associated with ID-PKC since the user’s private key is not only offered by the KGC but by a
combination of the KGC’s partial private key and the user’s secret value. As a result, the KGC
lacks information about the user’s full private key. Furthermore, CL-PKC successfully evades
certificate management with regard to certificate-based public key cryptography, such as revok-
ing, distributing and storing data. In order to achieve efficiency in terms of computational cost
and communication overhead, this present work adopts a signcryption technique to accomplish
both encryption and signature in one logical step.
To adjust the current work by adopting a signcryption technique, certificateless signcryp-
tion (CLSC) schemes are used in capturing communication with respect to both confidentiality
and unforgeability. The first CLSC scheme was proposed by Barbosa and Farshim [8] using
a formal security analysis as evidenced in the random oracle model. The proposed scheme is
premised on a process of aggregation, which lowers the volume of exchanged information and
signature verification as well as massive data unsigncryption, thus attaining scalability, and lower
computational and communication costs. These can be achieved with a single step of particu-
lar importance to low communication network bandwidths as well as computationally restricted
environments. Although Eslami et al. [31] and Lu et al. [51] proposed certificateless aggregate
signcryption (CLASC), these schemes are realized using many pairing operations that may lead
to high computational cost and time consumption if there is an increase in the number of vehicles.
This chapter presents an efficient privacy-preserving protocol to solve the aforementioned
security and privacy challenges in FVCS. A review of previous research suggests that, in building
a CLASC scheme, this is the most efficient work to date. The main contributions of this chapter
are as follows:
• A new and efficient CLASC scheme is proposed. This scheme offers a significant improve-
ment over the pairings required by aggregate signature verification and unsigncryption that
are needed in order to protect crowdsensing reports from being disclosed.
• Based on the proposed CLASC scheme, a privacy-preserving protocol for enhancing secu-
rity and privacy in FVCS road surface condition monitoring systems is also proposed.
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• The proposed scheme resists various security and privacy threats. It also preserves user
privacy while achieving lightweight aggregation. Furthermore, as a control center (CC)
cannot be fully trusted, the proposed scheme shows a CC cannot reveal private keys even
if compromised.
• Extensive simulations were conducted in terms of computational cost and communication
overhead. The simulation results well demonstrate that the proposed scheme is much more
efficient compared to existing schemes [31], [51] and outperforms them.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the system models and design
goals are presented followed by the preliminaries in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, the CLASC
scheme is introduced in detail. The proposed privacy-preserving protocol is described in Section
3.5. Security analysis is given in Section 3.6 followed by performance evaluation in Section
3.7. A summary of the chapter is presented in Section 3.8 while the limitation of this chapter is
discussed in Section 3.9.
3.2 System Models and Design Goals
This section presents the system model, threat model and design goals.
3.2.1 System Model
Motivated by the various applications found in the current literature, a road surface condition
monitoring system comprised of a CC, vehicles, RSUs as fog devices, and cloud servers, is
considered (see Figure 3.1).
• A CC is a powerful entity in charge of the entire system and responsible for initializing
the system. In the proposed scheme, the CC works as the key generation center. As the
function of the CC may be undertaken by a commercial organization, it cannot be fully
trusted. Therefore, to avoid the key escrow problem, it only generates a partial private key
for the participants and is blocked from accessing both vehicle and RSU sensitive data. It







Figure 3.1: System model
• Vehicles generate a significant volume of data, including time, location and road event
indicators, such as potholes or slippery surfaces (see Figure 3.1)
• An RSU is considered to be an efficient computational and storage device that can extend
the cloud services to the edge. RSUs have the ability to react and make decisions close to
the end users. All the real-time data sensed by the vehicles are sent to the RSU for imme-
diate processing. As an example, once processed, the RSUs can send an alert regarding
road hazards at a specific location.
• Cloud servers are the data centers of the system. System data, such as historic information,
are stored in the cloud to be later utilized. The advantage of a fog device is that instead of
sending all the data generated by the vehicles to the cloud for processing (which can lead
to high bandwidth cost and high latency), RSUs perform the computation at the edge and


















Figure 3.2: Threat model
The threat model assumes that the connection between RSUs and cloud servers is secure and
that they are fully-trusted components. In this present work, attention is focused on the threat to
data generated by vehicles, which is then forwarded to the RSUs. As shown in Figure 3.2, road
event reports that are devoid of content-oriented privacy may result in eavesdroppers disclosing
the road event report of the source, causing the receiver to be given false road event reports.
Malicious attackers may modify or fabricate the data for their own purposes. Particularly, the
adversary can control the entire communication channel and monitor all the data passing through
the channel. The adversary can also tamper with the message, drop some packets or even replace
the original message. Furthermore, all the data transmitted to/through RSUs and vehicles can be
32
intercepted and analyzed by the adversary. In particular, a vehicle could become malicious by
generating false reports for its own benefit; for example, it could gain credits for contributing to a
crowdsensing task. Ultimately, the CC as a key generation center cannot be fully trusted because
it may be represented by a commercial organization. By considering the commercial benefits,
it is natural for a CC to misbehave in ways such as illegally collecting and accessing vehicle
sensitive information. It may also disclose users’ authentication keys and fabricate road event
reports. Therefore, in order to prevent an adversary or malicious vehicles from violating vehicle
privacy during the generating of crowdsensing reports, the following security goals should be
satisfied.
3.2.3 Design Goals
The present work aims to achieve the following security and performance objectives, based on
the system model and potential threats.
1. Security objectives
• Data confidentiality and integrity. All accepted crowdsensing reports should be de-
livered unaltered, and the origin of these reports should be protected from revealing
private and sensitive information.
• Mutual authentication. The vehicles and the RSU should authenticate each other in
order to guarantee that the data is from the source and, once received, is unaltered.
• Anonymity. Vehicle identity should be hidden from a normal message receiver during
the authentication process in order to protect the sender’s private information.
• Key escrow resilience. The key generation center does not have the users’ full private
keys. Therefore, this proposal ensures that an adversary will not gain access to users’
full private keys if a CC is compromised.
2. Performance objectives
• Low communication overhead and fast verification. The security scheme should be
efficient in terms of communication overhead and acceptable processing latency. A
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large number of report signatures should be first verified and then unsigncrypted
within a short interval.
• Robustness. The crowdsensing reports generated via vehicles should not be accessed
in case part of the private keys is infiltrated.
3.3 Preliminaries
This section starts with basic concepts and portrays the necessary complexity assumptions. Then,
the framework and security model of CLASC are presented.
3.3.1 Bilinear Maps
We recall the bilinear pairing technique, which serves as the basis of our proposed CLASC. Let
G be an additive group of large prime order q, andGT be a multiplicative group of the same large
prime order and P be a generator of G. An admissible bilinear pairing ê : G×G→GT is a map
with the following properties.
• Bilinearity: for all P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q ,we have ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab
• Non-degeneracy: ê(P,Q)6=1GT where 1GT denotes the identity element of group G.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P,Q) for P ,Q ∈ G. An
admissible bilinear pairing ê : G×G→GT can be implemented by the modified Weil/Tate
pairings over elliptic curves [17].
Definition 1: Bilinear Parameter Generator. A bilinear parameter generator Gen is a proba-
bilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input, and outputs a 5-tuple (G,GT ,ê, P, q)
where q is a k-bit prime number, G and GT are two groups with order q, P ∈ G is a generator,
and ê is a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map.
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3.3.2 Complexity Assumptions
We recall the following intractability assumptions related to the security of our scheme.
Definition 2: Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Given P, aP, bP ∈ G, ∀ a, b ∈
Z∗q , the CDH problem is to compute abP ∈ G probability within polynomial time.
Definition 3: Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem. Given P, aP, bP, cP ∈
G, ∀ a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and x ∈ GT , DBDH problem is to decide wheather x = ê(P, P )abc.
3.3.3 Framework of Certificateless Aggregate Signcryption
Based on Eslami et al. [31] and Lu et al. [51], we first define the participants involved in a
framework of a CLASC scheme. They are composed of four parties which are: a KGC, an
aggregating set IDi of n users with an identity {IDi}ni=1, a receiver with an identity IDR and
an aggregate signcryption generator. The framework of a CLASC scheme is defined by the
following seven probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms.
• Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as input and outputs system parameters
params and a master private key s, a corresponding master public key Ppub. Then, the
KGC carries out the algorithm and publishes params. The key s is kept secure.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Given the system parameters params, s and identity IDi of
an entity i. It returns a partial private key Di. Then, the KGC calculates the algorithm to
generate Di that is sent to the corresponding user i through a secure channel.
• User-Key-Generate: This algorithm is run by each user and takes params and user’s iden-
tity IDi as input. It returns a randomly chosen secret value xi and a corresponding public
key Yi for the entity. Then, the user generates his own public key and then publishes it.
• Signcrypt: This algorithm runs by each user IDi in an aggregating set of n users {IDi}ni=1.
It takes params and some state information ∆. All of the users must use the same unique
state information in the signcryption algorithm for an aggregating set, a messageMi, user’s
identity IDi with corresponding public key Yi and private key (xi, Di), the receiver identity
IDR with corresponding public key YR as input. This algorithm returns a ciphertext Ci.
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• Aggregate: This algorithm is run by the aggregate signcryption generator and takes an
aggregating set IDi of n users {IDi}ni=1, ∆, user’s identity IDi of each sender with cor-
responding public key Yi and Ci on a message Mi as input. The message is ciphered with
the state information ∆ with the receiver identity IDR with corresponding public key YR.
It outputs an aggregated ciphertext C on messages {Mi}ni=1.
• Aggregate-Verify: This algorithm is performed by the the receiver IDR and takes as input
an aggregating set of n users {IDi}ni=1, user’s identity IDi of each sender with corre-
sponding public key Yi, the receiver identity IDR with corresponding public key YR , state
information ∆, and an aggregated ciphertext C. If the aggregate signcryption is valid,
algorithm returns true otherwise false.
• Unsigncrypt: The receiver IDR performs this algorithm that takes as input an aggregated
ciphertext C, state information ∆, the receiver full private key (xR, DR), his identity IDR
and public key YR, and the senders identities {IDi}ni=1 with their corresponding public
keys {Yi}ni=1. It returns a set of n plaintexts {Mi}ni=1.
3.3.4 Security Model of CLASC
A certificateless cryptography may be subject to two types of adversaries [3]. Type I adversary
may request entities public keys and replace keys with values of its choice but is not allowed
to access the master private key. Type II adversary on the other hand may access the master
private key but is not allowed to replace the public key of the entities. The CLASC scheme has
two security objectives which are: confidentiality for the signcryption and encryption mode; and
unforgeability for signcryption and signature mode. There exists an interactive game between
a challenger C and an adversary A to prove the security of a CLASC scheme. There are four
games for confidentiality and unforgeability between C and type I, type II adversary respectively.
Eslami et al. [31] provide details for the four games. Thus, to avoid reinventing the wheel, we
refer to their work for the security model of a CLASC scheme and also, provide the definitions
based on the games as declared in their work.
Definition 4: Confidentiality of CLASC. A CLASC scheme is semantically secure under
adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if no PPT adversary (of either Type) has a
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non-negligible advantage in Game I or Game II. As the adversaries can access the private keys of
all of the senders, therefore; this definition assures that confidentiality is preserved even if these
keys are compromised and insider security is guaranteed.
Definition 5: Unforgeability of CLASC. A CLASC scheme is existentially unforgeable under
adaptively chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) if no PPT adversary (of either Type) has a non-
negligible advantage in the Game III or the Game IV. As the adversaries can access the private
key of the receiver, therefore this definition assures that unforgeability is preserved even if this
key is compromised and insider security is guaranteed.
3.4 Proposed CLASC scheme
In this section, we propose an efficient CLASC scheme that serves as the design basis for our
privacy-preserving protocol.
We propose a solid and promising CLASC scheme that outperforms the existing schemes
[31] [51]. They utilize the bilinear map that is an efficient way of pairing. However, their
schemes suffer from high computational complexity because of the number of pairing operations
for signcryption, aggregate, aggregate verification and unsigncryption. Therefore, we address
this problem by reducing pairing operations and thus achieving low computational and commu-
nication cost. The proposed CLASC scheme is composed by the following six algorithms.
1. Setup: Given the security parameters k, and this algorithm is performed by the KGC as
follows.
• Chooses a cyclic additive group G of prime order q on elliptic curve, and P is an
arbitrary generator of G.
• Chooses a cyclic multiplicative group GT of the same order q and a bilinear map
ê : G × G→ GT .
• Randomly selects a master private key s ∈ Z∗q and compute the master public key
Ppub = sP .
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• Selects four secure hash functions H1 :{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 :{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n here n
is the bit-length of plaintexts, H3: {0, 1}∗→ G and H4: Z∗q → G.
• Publishes the system parameter params= (G,GT , ê, P, q, Ppub, H1, H2, H3, H4) and
the master private key s will be kept secure by the KGC.
2. Key-Generation: This algorithm is interactively performed by the user IDi and KGC as
follows.
• The user IDi randomly chooses xi ∈ Z∗q as the secret value and computes a partial
public key Yib = xiP .
• The user sends its identity and partial public key (IDi, Yib) to the KGC.
• The KGC then randomly selects yi ∈ Z∗q and compute another partial public key for
the user Yia = yiP , so the full public key for the user is (Yib, Yia).
• The KGC computes the partial private key Di = yi + s ∗ Qi where Qi = H1(IDi),
and Di is sent securely to the user IDi.
• The user IDi judges the validity of the partial private key by checking,
DiP = Yia + PpubQi.
Notably, these procedures finish three different algorithms which are, set-secret-
value, partial-private-key-extract and set-public-key of the proposed scheme. These
algorithms generate public key (Yib, Yia) that is kept in the public tree by the KGC,
and the full private key (xi, Di) is kept secret by the user.
3. Signcrypt: This algorithm is performed by a sender IDi to signcrypt the message mi with
IDR as a receiver. IDi performs the algorithm as follows.
• IDi randomly selects r ∈ Z∗q and computes,
• Ti = rP .
• Zb = rYrb.
• Za = r(Yra + PpubQi).
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• ha = H2(QR||Yra||Yrb||∆||Ti||Zb||Za).
• Ki = ha ⊕mi.
• hb = H3(QR||Yra||Yrb||∆||Ti||Ki||Qi||Yib||Yia).
• hc = H4(∆).
• αi = Dihc + rhb + xihc.
• Returns the ciphertext Ci = (Ti, Ki, αi)
4. Aggregate: This algorithm is performed by aggregator signcryption generator on the re-
ceiver QR as follows.




• This algorithm outputs the aggregate ciphertexts C = (T1...Tn, K1...Kn, α).
5. Aggregate-Verify: This algorithm is run by a receiver QR and computes the following.
• hb = H3(QR||Yra||Yrb||∆||Ti||Ki||Qi||Yib||Yia), for i = 1..., n.
• hc = H4(∆).
• QR verifies ê(α, P ) = ê(
n∑
i=1






Yib, hc). If this equa-
tion holds, this algorithm outputs true otherwise false.
6. Unsigncrypt: If the output of Aggregate-Verify algorithm is true, this algorithm is per-
formed by the receiver QR who computes the following.
• Zb′ = xrTi.
• Za′ = DrTi.
• ha′ = H2(QR||Yra||Yrb||∆||Ti||Zb′||Za′).
• mi′ = Ki ⊕ ha′.
• This algorithm outputs {mi}ni=1.
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• The correctness of our signature scheme is as follows.






































• The correctness of our decryption scheme is as follows.
mi′ = Ki ⊕ ha′
= H2(Qi||Yia||Yib||∆||Ti||Zb||Za)⊕mi ⊕ ha′
= ha ⊕mi ⊕ ha′
= mi
3.5 Proposed Privacy-Preserving Protocol
In this section, we present the details of our privacy-preserving protocol. In this application
scenario, RSUs are considered as fog devices, which are able to aggregate the crowdsensing
reports, verify them and then perform decryption. Our certificateless aggregate signcryption
scheme is introduced in the protocol to fulfill the design objectives. The proposed protocol
consists of four steps: system initialization, data formulation and sending, secure road event
report (SRER) aggregated verification, and data receiving.
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3.5.1 System Initialization
The vehicles and RSUs register to the CC to generate their full public and private keys. Moreover,
CC determines the format of road event report that is generated by the vehicles.
Given the security parameter k, the CC first generates the bilinear parameters (G,GT ,ê,
P, q) by running Gen(k). Then, the CC randomly selects s ∈ Z∗q as its master secret key and
computes its master public key Ppub = sP . Additionally, the CC chooses four secure hash
functions: H1 :{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 :{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n here n is the bit-length of plaintexts, H3:
{0, 1}∗ → G and H4: Z∗q → G. After that, the system parameters params will be published,
which include (G,GT , ê, P, q, Ppub, H1, H2, H3, H4).
A significant task of the setup procedure is to determine the format of secure road event
report SRERij . For a road event REi , the vehicles Senjwill generate the data where Datai =
(Timeij, Locationi, Signalsi) and the SRERij will securely forward to the RSU in the format
SRERij = (Qj, Signcrypt(Datai)) where,
Timeij denotes the time when the vehicle j makes the claim on a road event i.
Locationi denotes the place where the road event takes place.
Qj denotes the pseudo identity of the vehicle that generates the report.
Datai denotes a report generated by a vehicle about road event.
Signcryptij denotes the signcryption generated by the vehicle Senj on the road event REi that
sends to RSU. Vehicles and RSUs can join the system by performing the following Steps.
• A vehicle Senj can randomly choose xj ∈ Z∗q as its secret value and compute its partial
public key Senjb = xjP .
• Senj sends its identity and partial public key (Senj, Senjb) to the CC for registration.
• The CC randomly selects yj ∈ Z∗q and compute another partial public key for the mobile
sensor Senja = yjP .
• The CC then computes the partial private key Dj = yj + s ∗ Qj ,where Qj = H1(Senj),
for the register Senj with partial public key Senjb.
• Dj is sent to the Senj via a secure channel. The full public key (Senjb, Senja) is kept in
the public tree by the CC.
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• The vehicle Senj receives the partial private key Dj and concatenates with its secret value
xj to form its full private key (Dj, xj).
3.5.2 Data Formulation and Sending
This part is performed by the source with a vehicle Qj . A road event REi is sensed by one or
multiple vehicles and then Datai, which include (Timeij, Locationi, Signalsi), is discovered.
After that,Qj with encryptedDatai as a SRERij sends to the RSU as fog device receiver. Then,
Qj utilizes the certificateless signcryption algorithm on Datai as follows.
• Senj randomly selects r ∈ Z∗q and computes the following,
• Tj = rP .
• Zb = rPKrb.
• Za = r(PKra + PpubQj).
• ha = H2(QR||PKra||PKrb||∆||Tj||Zb||Za).
• Kj = ha ⊕Datai.
• hb = H3(QR||PKra||PKrb||∆||Tj||Kj||Qj||Senja||Senjb).
• hc = H4(∆).
• αj = Djhc + rhb + xjhc.
The ciphertext Cj = (Tj, Kj, αj) is attached to SRER in the format as
SRERij = (Qj, Signcrypt(Datai), where Signcrypt(Datai) = Cj .
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3.5.3 SRER Aggregated Verification
Notably, this application scenario is based on vehicles to infrastructure communication (V2I)
which means vehicles can directly communicate with the RSUs. Once a road event REi is
sensed by one or multiple vehicles, they then generate a road event report SRERij that includes
accurate information such as time, location and the type of event. Suppose that RSCMS is
deployed on the highway, that massive of objects can pass through. Therefore, a bunch of data
will be generated by the various vehicles and sent to the closest RSU. If the RSU receives each
ciphertext separately to verify the signature and then usingcrypt it, this process will have a long
time that may lead to long delay. We exploit an advantage of fog devices, which are efficient
in computational cost and bandwidth. Therefore, our protocol provides the aggregation property
that the RSUs can aggregate all the ciphertexts generated by the multiple vehicles. This process
provides a sufficient amount of efficiency over sending each ciphertext separately. Whenever
receiving a SRER, the RSU can perform the SRER aggregation and SRER batch verification
operations as follows.
1. SRER aggregation
This algorithm is used to aggregate multiple SRERs into a single SRER. For a road event
REi , given n SRERs SRERij = (Qj, Signcrypt(Datai)) generated by vehicles Sen1, ....Senn,
we can obtain SRERagg = (Q1...Qn, Signcrypt(Datai)i1... Signcrypt(Datai)
n
i ). This al-
gorithm is performed by the RSU as follows.
• This algorithm takes a collection of individual ciphertexts Cj = (Tj, Kj, αj)nj=1 gen-
erated by vehicles with (Qj)nj=1 to a receiver with identity QR under the same state
information ∆, which is considered as a secret value to insure the aggregation phase.





• It outputs the aggregate ciphertexts SRERagg = ((Qj)nj=1, T1...Tn, K1...Kn, sigagg).
2. SRER batch verification
This step performs signature batch verification for all the ciphertexts simultaneously. Given




j=1 for all the vehicles and a receiver’s identity IDR, and its correspond-
ing public key (PKra, PKrb) using the same state information ∆. In order to verify the
signature, this algorithm computes the following.
• hb = H3(QR||PKra||PKrb||∆||Tj||Kj||Qj||Senja||Senjb), for j = 1, ..., n.
• hc = H4(∆).
The signature aggregation Sigagg accept if
ê(sigagg, P ) = ê(
n∑
j=1







If the batch verification holds, the RSU will accept SRERs in list V as a valid SRERs.
Then, the aggregated SRER SRERagg in V will be forwarded to complete unsigncryption
step. Once a road event report SRER is verified valid, RSU pursues the next unsigncryption
step.
3.5.4 Data Receiving
The RSU decrypts the SRERs when the signature verification outputs true. The RSU continues
to complete the decryption phase and computes the follows.
• Zb′ = xrTj .
• Za′ = DrTj .
• ha′ = H2(QR||PKra||PKrb||∆||Tj||Zb′||Za′).
• Datai′ = Kj ⊕ ha′.
3.6 Security Analysis
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol has been analyzed according to the security
objectives described in section 3.2.
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A. The proposed protocol achieves road report Dataj confidentiality and integrity.
The vehicles signcrypt Dataj as Cj = (Tj, Kj, αj), where Tj and Kj fulfill the encryption
part and αj achieves digital signature in one logical step. Only the RSU unsigncryptsDataj′
by computing Tj , Kj and αj . Therefore, according to Definition 4 and Definition 5 the
encryption and signature achieve confidentiality and unforgeability under CDH problem.
B. The proposed protocol can achieve the mutual authentication.
RSU is authenticated by the signcryption on the road report Dataj that is generated by the
vehicle. Particularly, in the proposed protocol, in order to verify and decrypt the crowd-
sensing report, only the RSU that holds the private key (DR, xR) is able to perform these
procedures. The vehicle computes Za and Zb through the signcryption algorithm to establish
the mutual authentication. RSU authenticates the source road report by verifying the sign-
cryption on the Dataj . Therefore, according to Definition 5 we deduce that the adversary
cannot forge the signature on the message without the full private key under DBDH problem
in the signcryption unforgeability theorem.
C. The proposed protocol achieves anonymity.
CC computes a pseudo identity Qi for users in order to fulfill anonymity. This pseudo
identity is calculated from the user’s real identity. It is used during the entire road report
transmission processes. Therefore, all the malicious parties can not reveal the real identity
of the requesting user either vehicle or RSU.
D. The proposed protocol achieves key escrow resilience.
Because the proposed protocol relies on CL-PKC, the CC can only generate the partial pri-
vate key Di for the user who is then able to compute the full private key (Dj, xj) after
randomly selecting its secret value xj . Therefore, even the CC is compromised, we insure
that the adversary cannot get user’s full private keys.
3.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving protocol in terms
of the computational cost and communication overhead. To demonstrate the efficiency of pro-
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posed protocol, we compare proposed CLASC scheme with the existing schemes [31], [51],
which suffer from computational complexity and communication cost due to the fact that pairing
and exponentiation operations take much more computation time.
3.7.1 Computational Cost
To the best of our knowledge, we compare the efficiency of our scheme with the certificateless
aggregate signcryption scheme available in the literature [31], [51]. As the operations scalar mul-
tiplication in G, exponentiation in GT and pairing dominate the computational cost, we consider
those three operations in computing the time consumption. We denote tp the time consump-
tion of pairing, tm the time consumption of a scalar point multiplication in G and te the time
consumption of an exponentiation in GT .
In the proposed CLASC scheme, each sender signcrypts the data separately unlike the re-
ceiver that is able to aggregate verify all the signature parts of ciphertexts and then unsigncrypt
them. The signcryption algorithm takes six multiplication operations inG to compute both signa-
ture and encryption. On the other hand, the unsigncrypt algorithm needs four pairing operations
and two scalar multiplication operations to aggregate verify the signature and unsigncrypt the
ciphertexts.
On the receiver side, verification of signatures can be performed in a single step rather than
verifying each signature separately. The computational cost in the receiver side is more efficient
than existing schemes. Therefore, efficiency of aggregate signcryption schemes can be evaluated
by computing the number of cryptographic operations, including tp , tm and te. The comparison
of the computational cost among schemes are demonstrated in Table 3.1. While the proposed
CLASC in Table 3.1 is implemented without exponentiations, we demonstrate that the existing
CLASC schemes have utilized three operations on pairing, multiplication and exponentiation.
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Table 3.1: Cryptographic operations comparison with other CLASC schemes
Signcrypt
schemes tp tm te
Lu et al. [51] 1 5 0
Ziba et al. [31] 1 4 1
Proposed 0 6 0
UnSigncrypt
schemes tp tm te
Lu et al. [51] 10 2 0
Ziba et al. [31] 5 1 0
Proposed 4 2 0
In order to evaluate the computation of efficiency of the proposed protocol, an MNT curve
[60] with the pairing ê : G × G → GT defined over this curve will be employed, where the
embedding degree of the curve is 6 and q is 160 bit. The implementation was executed on an
Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHZ machine [74]. The running time is shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Cryptographic operations running time
Operation Running Time Descriptions
tm 0.6 ms The time for a scalar point multiplication
tp 4.5 ms The time for one pairing operation
Figure 3.3 shows the comparison of computational cost between the existing CLASC schemes
and our proposed scheme. It demonstrates that our proposed CLASC scheme needs much fewer
computation of time than other CLASC schemes because of the fact that the pairing and expo-
nentiation operations take much longer computation time than the multiplication operation. Our
proposed scheme needs four pairing operations while the scheme in [31] has six pairing opera-
tions with one exponentiation operation and [51] has eleven pairing operations. Therefore, our
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proposed CLASC scheme outperforms the competitive schemes because it has fewer number of
pairing operations and does not perform exponentiation operations. Based on the running time
results in [74], the computational cost in the whole scheme Tk =8tm + 4tp = 8 * 0.6 + 4 * 4.5
= 22.8 ms. However, there are unique features in the VCS such as mobility. Specifically, the
moving vehicle acts as a sender in the assumed application scenario. Consequently, the proposed
scheme provides a lightweight signcryption that its time consumption Ts = 6tm = 3.6 ms. On
the other hand, the receiver RSU, is a fog device that has a high computational capability and the
time consumption for unsigncryption Tu =2tm + 4tp = 19.2 ms, which is an efficient reasonable



































Figure 3.3: Efficiency comparison with other CLASC schemes
3.7.2 Communication Overhead
In the proposed CLASC scheme, the communication cost is determined by the size of the aggre-
gated ciphertext length SRERagg, which is mainly due to report aggregation and batch verifica-
tion. However, it is not possible to reduce the communication overhead of a CLASC scheme to
a constant value because two parts of each ciphertext are needed for decryption. In contrast, the
aggregated ciphertext SRERagg has n+ 1 elements in G for achieving the security level. There-
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fore, we have an efficient protocol that has much fewer computational time than other schemes,
without increasing the communication cost, as shown in Table 3.3. Thus, the proposed protocol
is suitable for narrow bandwidth and terminals with limited resources.
Table 3.3: Computational cost and communication overhead analysis
Scheme Computational Cost Communication Overhead
Lu et al. [51] 11tp + 7tm (n+ 1)|G|+ n|m|
Ziba et al. [31] 6tp + 5tm + te (n+ 1)|G|+ n|m|
Proposed 4tp + 8tm (n+ 1)|G|+ n|m|
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, a novel efficient certificateless aggregate signcryption (CLASC) scheme is pro-
posed. Then, a privacy-preserving protocol in FVCS is designed based on the proposed CLASC
scheme. In addition, the proposed privacy-preserving protocol meets the security requirements
such as data confidentiality and integrity, mutual authentication, anonymity and key escrow re-
silience. Extensive comparisons of computational cost and communication overhead show that
the proposed scheme can achieve much better efficiency than the existing schemes.
3.9 Limitation
The present study has some limitations within which the findings need to be interpreted care-
fully. The present study was on vehicular networks that have unique features such as vehicle
mobility. This is because of the nature and characteristics of vehicular networks. It is worth
pointing out that the proposed protocol uses only a pseudo identity in order to achieve identity
privacy. However, this approach may lead to a privacy concern by using one pseudo identity
during mobility [73]. Furthermore, the reported locations in the future traffic information from a
vehicle can be used to link pseudo identity that may discover a vehicle’s real-world identity [34].
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In this work, we do not elaborate vehicle’s pseudo identities change technique due to the fact
that this problem is well-studied in the past. In the proposed scheme, we can adopt the mix-zone
technique that provides promising ways to avoid this challenge. For instance, when all the ve-
hicles approaching an intersection where there is an RSU deployed, they coordinate with each
other and change their pseudo identities at the same time. Also, their public and private keys are
updated accordingly with the involvement of CC through the RSU. CC will update the public
tree with the vehicles new public keys as well.
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Chapter 4
Efficient Compromised Node Revocation in
Fog-Assisted Vehicular Crowdsensing
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 introduces a secure and efficient privacy-preserving protocol in FVCS. However, a
legitimate user may become compromised if detected as a malicious user whether its subscrip-
tion expires or not. Unfortunately, the proposed privacy-preserving protocol is not suitable for
addressing this issue. Therefore, this chapter presents a solution to the problem from a different
perspective by allowing a KGC to revoke a detected malicious user from the system.
A comprehensive set of security mechanisms integrated into the VCS applicatios is critical
for their deployment, especially because of the life-critical nature of the vehicular network oper-
ation. The security architecture will make use of the KGC or authority to manage the identities,
credentials, and cryptographic keys of all network nodes [70]. Therefore, instead of an ad-hoc or
web-of-trust method [69], this approach is considered appropriate in the field of VCS.
Generally, security and privacy challenges need to be addressed because road event reports
may be disclosed by compromised users. Furthermore, a vehicle could generate false reports for
his/her own benefits. For example, giving a notice for traffic jam at a specific location while this
location is being clear. Moreover, the KGC cannot be fully trusted since it is usually acted by a
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commercial organization. In particular, if the KGC is being compromised, the vehicles private
information will be disclosed. In this chapter, we focus our attention to the threat of existing
malicious users after detection.
User revocation issue is crucial and should be addressed. The following are some of the
serious challenges FVCS applications may encounter. First, each legitimated user either vehicle
or RSU has subscription expiry for their private keys during participation. For example, if the
vehicle or RSU has expired time for their legal participation and at the same time are detected as a
malicious user, they are then considered as a compromised user who may breach the system. One
more challenge is from different perspective when a participated user is detected as a malicious
user even its private key is still valid. Furthermore, RSUs as a compromised node may generate
results for undesired purposes. As a result, the immediate road condition result generated by the
malicious RSUs can be accessed by a legitimate vehicle. Therefore, it is logical to provide a
privacy-preserving protocol with revocation functionality in order to address the aforementioned
issues.
There are also several privacy-preserving designs with revocation functionality in a large-
scale environment in the VANETs [98], [68], [92] . The majority of these protocols use CRL
method and some utilizes certificate free protocols such as ID-PKC. However, these protocols
suffer from high computational cost and time consumption, and key escrow problems. We exploit
the advantage of CL-PKC, which solves key escrow problem in ID-PKC. We adopt CL-PKC
as the basis of our solution. While there are some designs of revocation approaches for CL-
PKC [86], [80], [90], incorporating the revocation functionality on the CLASC scheme may
be difficult. Furthermore, the workload of KGC on compromised user revocation becomes a
bottleneck once the overhead increases linearly as the number of users in the FVCS applications
increases. Thus, designing a privacy-preserving protocol based on CL-PKC with an efficient
revocation is a non-trivial task.
In this chapter, we aim to design an efficient revocable privacy-preserving protocol for FVCS
in order to successfully address the aforementioned challenges. To the best of our knowledge,
this work is considered as the first privacy-preserving scheme that supports efficient revocation
mechanism based on the CLASC scheme. In the proposed scheme, a compromised user will be
revoked from the system by the KGC to guarantee the system is free from any security threats
and privacy risks. To be more specific, the main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
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• Based on the proposed CLASC scheme [11], a data transmission protocol, which im-
plements compromised user revocation mechanism for enhancing security and privacy in
FVCS, is designed [10].
• Then, the proposed scheme is based on a binary tree structure in order to achieve an effi-
cient revocation functionality.
• The designed scheme assures that the workload of the KGC only increases logarithmically
with the number of users.
• The proposed scheme has the lowest computational cost and avoids the key escrow prob-
lem compared to the counterparts [98], [68], [92].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the system models and design
goals are presented. In Section 4.3, the proposed revocable privacy-preserving protocol is pre-
sented in detail. Security analysis is given in Section 4.4 followed by performance evaluation in
Section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarizes the chapter while the limitation of this chapter is discussed
in Section 4.7.
4.2 System Models and Design Goals
In this section, we define system model, threat model, and identify the design goals.
A. System Model
As shown in Figure 4.1, the system model comprises of KGC, vehicles, RSUs as fog nodes,
and cloud servers. Vehicles should be registered with KGC and preloaded with the public
parameters before it generates road event reports. For safety reasons, a vehicle must be
revoked from the system in case KGC detects the misbehavior of that vehicle by declaring it
as compromised. RSUs have the ability to react and make decisions close to the end users.
RSUs should also be registered with KGC and preloaded with public parameters before
they provide results. The revocation of the RSUs is necessary as well in case the RSUs
violate system rules. KGC is in charge of the enrollment and eviction of vehicles and RSUs.
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Moreover, in order to renew the private keys for the users (e.g., vehicle, RSU), KGC first
checks if that user is discovered as malicious or not. Thus, KGC can take the decision to
revoke that user or just broadcast the time key update for him to resume the system. Cloud
servers are the data centers of the system. The system data such as historic information is
stored in the cloud to be utilized later.
Cloud Servers
Fog RSU Fog RSU
KGC
Figure 4.1: System model
B. Threat Model
In this threat model, we focus our attention to the threat of legitimate users (e.g., vehicles
or RSUs) in case they become compromised. As we assumed in the previous chapter, RSUs
are considered as fully-trusted nodes but they may be detected as a misbehaved user or their
private keys are compromised. In particular, any legitimate user in the system has a certain
time period for its private key to participate. If the private keys for legal users have expired
and detected as malicious users, they then become compromised users and thus can tam-
per the system. One of the threat challenges, a compromised vehicle can still use the keys
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and thus fabricate the crowdsensing reports for his own purposes. As a result, this com-
promised vehicle can send bogus information to the RSU for processing. Furthermore, a
compromised RSU is also capable to decrypt crowdsensing reports generated by legal ve-
hicles. Consequently, it can disclose the privacy of vehicles and can create false results for
certain benefits. Finally, as the KGC may be represented by a commercial organization, it
can not be fully trusted. By considering the commercial benefits, it is natural for KGC to
misbehave such as illegally collecting and accessing vehicles sensitive information. There-
fore, in order to protect the system from any these challenges, the following security goals
should be achieved.
C. Design Goals
The design goals are to propose an efficient revocable privacy-preserving protocol in FVCS.
The proposed protocol combines an efficient revocation mechanism based on binary tree
structure with the CLASC scheme to address the possible above threats. Specifically, the
proposed protocol should achieve the following design goals.
• Revocation functionality. The revocation mechanism takes place against any user whose
is detected as malicious and his subscription may be expired. Thus, it is considered as
a compromised user. Therefore, the KGC should revoke the compromised users from
the system. in addition, when the detected malicious user may still have valid time
period for participation, KGC can also revoke him by distributing key update keys for
renew the subscription of legal users except the malicious one. As a result, achieving
this significant goal leads to fulfilling the following design goals.
– Data confidentiality and integrity. Compromised vehicles cannot modify the crowd-
sensing reports that should be protected from any tampering. On the other hand, a
compromised RSU can not modify the result for his own purposes. Furthermore,
compromised RSUs are not able to decrypt the crowdsensing reports and obtain
the data from the legitimate vehicles.
– Key escrow resilience. The KGC only generates partial private keys for the regis-
ters to avoid key escrow problem. As a result, it is blocked to access the vehicles
private information.
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4.3 Construction of the proposed protocol
In this section, we initially present the basic concepts and the necessary complexity assumptions
of the proposed protocol. Then, we define a KUNodes algorithm [16] which is used to achieve
the efficient revocation function, e.g., reducing the key update costs. Furthermore, we propose
an efficient privacy-preserving scheme for compromised node revocation in FVCS.
4.3.1 Preliminaries
I. Bilinear Maps.
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with the generator g of large prime order q, and
GT be another cyclic multiplicative group of the same large prime order q. An admissible
bilinear pairing ê : G × G→ GT is a map with the following properties.
• Bilinearity. For all u, u′, v, v′ ∈ G, ê(uu′, v) = ê(u, v)ê(u′, v) and ê(u, vv′) =
ê(u, v)ê(u, v′).
• Non-degeneracy. There exist g, g1 ∈ G such that ê(g, g1) 6= 1GT .
• Computability. For all g, g1 ∈ G, there is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(g, g1).
An admissible bilinear pairing ê : G × G → GT can be implemented by the modified
Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic curves [17].
II. Complexity Assumptions.
We recall the following intractability assumptions related to the security of our scheme.
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem): Given a tuple (g, ga, gb) ∈
G for some a, b ∈ Z∗q , the CDH problem in G is to compute the element gab.
Definition 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH): Given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈
G for some a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and x ∈ GT , the DBDH problem is to decide whether x holds
ê(g, g)abc or not.
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4.3.2 KUNode Algorithm Definition
In order to overcome scalability concerns, we define the KUNode algorithm that applies a binary
tree structure, where each leaf node ηi represents a user ui. This algorithm is used to compute the
minimal set of nodes when a compromised node must be revoked. It generates key updates for
these nodes. As a result, only non-revoked vehicles at time T are able to signcrypt crowdsensing
reports and non-revoked RSUs can unsigncrypt ciphertexts. Basically, this algorithm takes as
input a binary tree BT , revocation list RL, and time T , and outputs a set of nodes for the key
update. If a compromised user ηi is revoked within the time period Ti, then the item (ηi, Ti) is
inserted into the RL, (ηi, Ti) ∈ RL. Path(ηi) denotes the set of nodes on the Path inclusively
from the leaf node ηi to the root node R.
Figure 4.2: An example of compromised node revocation in KUNodes algorithm
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This algorithm works as follows: In case no user has been detected as malicious, the root
node will be returned by the KUNode algorithm. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 4.2,
if a user u6, who is assigned to the leaf node x13, has been compromised, the set of nodes
Path(x13) = {x13, x6, x3, R} will be inserted into the setX that has the ancestors of the revoked
user. The KUNode algorithm then selects sibling nodes according to Path(x13). For example,
choosing x12 which is sibling with revoked node x13, x7 through its revoked sibling x6 and x2 that
is sibling with revoked node x3. Thus, the KUNode algorithm returns a new set Y = {x12, x7, x2}
that does not contain any ancestors of revoked users. Consequently, all users except the revoked
user u6, have a node y ∈ Y that is contained in the set of nodes on the path from their assigned
node to the root node. Therefore, u1, u2, u3 and u4 have the node x2 ∈ Y , u5 has the node
x12 ∈ Y , and u7 and u8 have the node x7 ∈ Y , whereas Y ∩ Path(x13) = ∅ as illustrated in
Figure 4.2.
When a user, for instance an RSU or a vehicle, joins the system, KGC first assigns a random
leaf node ηi of a complete BT to this user, and then issues a set of initial partial private keys, i.e.,
identity component of partial private key to this user, where each key in this key set corresponds
to each node on Path. To get rid of revoked users, the KGC distributes the key updates i.e., time
component of partial private key for a set KUNode(BT,RL, T ) at time period T . Then, only
non-revoked users have at least one key corresponding to a node in KUNode(BT,RL, T ) and
are able to generate the full partial private key.
The advantage of adopting KUNode algorithm is to reduce the size of key update costs from
linear O(n) to logarithmic O(logn2 ) when the number of users increases. Particularly, instead of
KGC requires to compute key updates for each node separately, it just needs to broadcast them
to a set of nodes (i.e., x2, x7, x12) at time period. Evidently, it is computationally better in terms
of efficient revocation due to efficiency improvements at the stage of key updates. By exploiting
this advantage, we integrate KUNode algorithm with the CLASC scheme in order to design an
efficient revocable privacy-preserving protocol.
4.3.3 Proposed revocable privacy-preserving scheme
We present the details of our revocable privacy-preserving protocol, which consists of six phases:
system initialization, time update key, data formulation and sending, secure road event report
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(SRER) aggregated verification, data receiving and user revocation.
1. System Initialization
The KGC chooses a security parameter k, which ensures the security level of the sys-
tem and determines the prime order q of the bilinear groups. In general, k = 256 or 160
bits. In this phase, the vehicles and RSUs register with the KGC to generate their pub-
lic and full private keys. The KGC first selects a cyclic multiplicative group G with the
generator g of large prime order q, and GT be another cyclic multiplicative group of the
same order q and a bilinear map ê : G × G → GT . Then, the KGC chooses a random
master secret key s ∈ Z∗q and a random arbitrary generator g ∈ G. It also computes
its master public key Ppub = gs with picking a random element g1 ∈ G. Additionally,
the KGC chooses three secure hash functions: H1 :{0, 1}∗ → G, H2: Z∗q → G and H3:
G × GT → {0, 1}∗. The KGC sets an initially empty revocation list RL = ∅ and, a
state st = BT where BT denotes to a BT with N leaves. The KGC then publishes
the system parameter params = (G,GT , e, g, g1, q, Ppub, H1, H2, H3), RL, st and the
master secret key s will be kept secure by the KGC. The KGC also determines the for-
mat of SRERij . For a road event REi , the vehicles Senj will generate the data where
Dataj = (Timeij, Locationi, Signalsi) and the SRERij will securely forward to the
RSU in the format SRERij = (Qj, Signcrypt(Dataj)). Also, a binary tree will be con-
structed like the one shown in Figure 4.2, where leaf nodes (users) are vehicles or RSUs.
Vehicles and RSUs can join the system by performing the following steps:
• Before RSUs provide the results to the vehicles, A vehicle with identity Senj ran-
domly selects sID ∈ Z∗q as its secret value and computes its public key SenPK =
gsID.
• The KGC receives Senj’s identity and public key (Senj, SenPK) for registration. In
order to keep identity private, KGC computes Qj = H1(senj) as its pseudo identity.
• Then, the KGC computes the initial partial private key (identity component of partial
private key) by performing the following:
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– When a Senj provides its identity Qj , KGC first checks whether the identity Qj
exists in the RL or not. IF this Qj has already been revoked, the KGC aborts
initial partial private algorithm.
– Otherwise, KGC then stores the identity Qj in the leaf node ηQj , which is ran-
domly chosen from the BT .
– For each node θ ∈ Path(ηQj ), KGC selects s
Qj





the node θ that satisfies sQjθ1 + s
Qj
θ2 = s mod q in case this node has not been
initialized yet.
– If the node θ is already initialized, KGC retrieves sQjθ1 from node θ and selects
z
Qj
θ ∈ Z∗q .
– KGC computes (uQjθ1 , u
Qj









– KGC returns the initial partial private key DID = {(uQjθ1 , u
Qj
θ2 )}θ∈Path(ηQj ) to the
corresponding user via a secure channel.





θ2 )θ∈Path(ηRSU ) and its public key with secret value
(PKRSU , sRSU).
2. Time Update Key
This algorithm first finds a minimal set of nodes, which contains no ancestors of re-
voked users. It then computes the t-component of partial private key. For each node θ
∈ KUNode(BT,RL, T ), KGC generates the time update key and broadcasts it to all the
non-revoked users (NRU) using the following steps:
• KGC recalls sQjθ2 from the node θ, and chooses r
Qj
θ ∈ Z∗q .
• KGC computes the time update key (wQjθ1 , w
Qj








θ ), and sends
it to the corresponding NRU.




θ2 )θ∈KUNode(BT,RL,T ) to the corre-
sponding NRU.
• Once a non-revoked vehicle with identity Qj receives the time update key DIDt, it
can generate the full partial private key, by finding components of DID and DIDt,
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which were computed on the same node. In caseKUNode(BT,RL, T ) ∩ Path (ηQj )
= ∅, the generating of full partial private key algorithm will abort. Otherwise, a
vehicle performs the follows:
– Selects θ ∈ KUNode(BT,RL, T ).
– Chooses zQj , rQj ∈ Z∗q .















• A vehicle with identity Qj returns the full partial private key.















• Finally, a vehicle with identity Qj computes the full private key SKQj ,t, which is ex-
pressed as (DID1Qjt, DID
2
Qjt






3. Data Formulation and Sending
This part is performed by a non-revoked vehicle Qj . A road event REi is sensed by one or
multiple vehicles and then Dataj is discovered. After that, Qj with encrypted Dataj as a
SRERij sends to the RSU as fog device receiver. Then, the vehicles, associated with the
identity Qj and its public key SenPK within the time Ti, signcrypts Dataj in time period
Ti with a receiver IDRSU . Qj performs the following steps.
• Chooses a random value r ∈ Z∗q and computes,
• U = gr.
• K = ê(Ppub, g1)r.
• V = (PKRSU)r.
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• CID = H1(IDRSU)r.
• CID′ = H1(senj)r.
• TID = H2(Ti)r.
• CENC = H3(K,V )⊕ dataj .
• Z = H1(CENC , IDRSU , Qj, Ti, PKRSU , SenPK , U)sID.
• CSIGN1 = (DID1Qjt · CID′.T ID · Z).
• CSIGN2 = (DID2Qjt · U).
• CSIGN3 = (DID3Qjt · U).
• CSIGN = (CSIGN1, CSIGN2, CSIGN3).
• Returns C = (U,CENC , CSIGN , CID, TID).
The ciphertext C = (U,CENC , CSIGN , CID, TID) is attached to secure road event report
in the format as SRERij = (Qj, Signcrypt(Dataj)), where Signcrypt(Dataj) = C .
It is worth pointing out that we can adopt the mix-zone technique [34] to avoid the problem
when vehicle uses only one pseudo identitiy during mobility, which can be easily predicted
and inadequate to preserve driver privacy [73].
4. SRER Aggregated Verification
The RSU performs the SRER aggregation and SRER batch verification operations as fol-
lows:
i. SRER Aggregation
Aggregate SRER is used to aggregate multiple SRERs into a single SRER. For a
road event REi , given n SRERs SRERij = (Qj, Signcrypt(Dataj)) by vehicles
Sen1, ....Senn, we can obtain,





This algorithm takes a collection of individual ciphertexts,




generated by vehicles with (Qj)nj=1 to a receiver with identity IDRSU . Then, we have
aggregated the signature parts of ciphertexts and an aggregate signcryption genera-
tor computes the signature aggregation sigagg =
n∑
j=1




j=1, U1...Un, CENC1 ...CENCn , CID1...CIDn, T ID1...T IDn, sigagg).
ii. SRER Batch Verification
This step performs signature batch verification for all the ciphertexts simultaneously.
Given the signature aggregation sigagg, the report sets (SRERij)nj=1 , correspond-
ing public keys (SenPK)nj=1 for all vehicles and a receiver’s identity IDRSU , and its
corresponding public key (PKRSU). In order to verify the signature, this algorithm
computes Z = H1(CENC , IDRSU , Qj, Ti, PKRSU , SenPK , U)sID, for j = 1, ..., n.















Once RSUs receive SRERagg from vehicles within the time period Ti and signature ver-
ification outputs true, RSU performs the following operations to complete the decryption
phase.
• K′ = ê(U,DID1RSUt) · ê(CID,DID2RSUt)−1 · ê(TID,DID3RSUt)−1.
• V ′ = (U)sRSU .
• dataj′ = H3(K′, V ′) ⊕ CENC .
• Then, returns the report {dataj′}nj=1
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The correctness of our decryption scheme is as follows
K′ = ê(U,DID1RSUt) · ê(CID,DID2RSUt)−1 · ê(TID,DID3RSUt)−1
= ê(gr, gs1) · ê(gr, H1(IDRSU)z
RSU
θ +zRSU · ê(gr, H2(Ti)r
RSU













V ′ = V
m′ = H3(K′, V ′)⊕ CENC
= H3(K′, V ′)⊕H3(K,V )⊕m
m′ = m




































































If the private key of the user either a vehicle or RSU has been compromised or the attacker
has been detected, the leaf node ηQj or ηRSU , which is linked with identity Qj or IDRSU
along with the revocation time period Ti, is returned to the KGC who then updates the
revocation list by RL→ RL ∪ neither (Qj, Ti) or (IDRSU , Ti).
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze how the proposed protocol achieves the design goals described in
Section 4.2.
• Revocation functionality. The proposed protocol achieves revocation mechanism and ef-
ficiently expels misbehaving users from the system. Specifically, if the compromised ve-
hicle Qj or RSU IDRSU has been revoked in the time period Ti, the revocation function
can be easily carried out by updating the revocation list RL→ RL ∪ neither (Qj, Ti) or
(IDRSU , Ti). The KGC then publishes the time update key DIDt for the set KUNode(BT
,RL, T ). Therefore, only the unrevoked users can get the updated key according to the
complete BT algorithm [16]. Thus, the legitimate vehicles can signcrypt the reports while
the legitimate RSUs have the ability to unsigncrypt ciphertexts. Satisfying compromised
node revocation property helps achieving the following significant requirements.
– Data confidentiality and integrity. The proposed protocol guarantees the confiden-
tiality and integrity of the crowdsensing reports. The reports are signed and encrypted
under CDH problem. The encryption and signature achieve confidentiality and un-
forgeability. As a result, revoking the compromised RSU guarantees that it cannot
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decrypt any report and disclose vehicles privacy. Furthermore, the compromised ve-
hicle cannot modify the report in case it is successfully revoked from the system.
In particular, the vehicle signcrypts Dataj as C = (U,CENC , CSIGN , CID, TID),
where U , CENC ,CID, TID fulfill the encryption part and CSIGN achieves digital
signature in one logical step. Only the unrevoked RSU is able to unsigncrypt Dataj
because of the knowledge of its initial partial private key, user secret key and the
updated key issued by the KGC.
– Key escrow resilience. The key escrow problem can be solved in the proposed pro-
tocol such that the compromised KGC cannot neither disclose the users sensitive
information or impersonate them.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of computational
cost, communication overhead and KGC overhead.
4.5.1 Computational Cost
Currently, there are no scalable and revocable privacy-preserving protocols proposed in VCS
based on CLASC. Therefore, we have investigated some of the existing privacy-preserving pro-
tocols that are suitable for large-scale application in VANET. We compare our proposed protocol
with counterparts [98], [68], [92] in terms of computational cost and communication overhead.
As the operations exponentiation in G and GT , and pairing dominate the computational cost
of the algorithms, we consider these three operations in the time consumption. We denote tp
the time consumption of pairing, t1 the time consumption of exponentiation in G, t2 the time
consumption of exponentiation in GT .
The proposed protocol utilizes the signcryption technique, which achieves efficiency in terms
of computational cost and communication overhead. The proposed protocol is more efficient
than the existing protocols in terms of data generation, receiving and batch verification. The
comparison of the computational cost among protocols are demonstrated in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Data sending, receiving and batch verification comparison of different privacy-
preserving protocols
Schemes Data Generation/Receiving Batch Verification
Zhang [98] 22t1 + 3t2 + 5tp 13nt1 + 2ntp
Qin [68] 30t1 + 12t2 + 22tp 16nt1 + 7nt2 + 13ntp
Wang [92] 17t1 + 7t2 + 8tp 13nt1 + 2ntp
Our protocol 5t1 + t2 + tp nt1 + 5ntp
To evaluate the computational efficiency of the proposed protocol and quantify the running
time of the operations, we use the results in [81] as the benchmark for comparisons. To quan-
tify the running time of the cryptographic operations in the proposed scheme, the pairing-based
cryptography (PBC) library ver.0.4.18 [52] is used and the implementation of the algorithms
was executed on a 3.2 Ghz Pentium IV machine [81]. The running time are t1= 6.4 ms, t2= 0.6
ms and tp= 5.9 ms. Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of time consumption between existing pro-
tocols and our proposed protocol. It demonstrates that the proposed protocol requires less time





















Figure 4.3: Time consumption comparison
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It is fair to point out that the protocols [98], [68], [92] provide a significant security feature in
VANET, i.e., a group signature. However, in our application scenario every vehicle only needs
to generate its road condition report. Hence, due to application requirement, we consider every
vehicle only signcrypts its report separately once road condition takes place.
4.5.2 Communication Overhead
We denote |G|, |GT | and |m| the size of the elements in G, GT and the message respectively.
We consider the communication overhead at the size of the ciphertext. The ciphertext C is
composed of U,CENC , CSIGN , CID, TID. Thus, the size of the ciphertext is 4|G| + |m|. It is
not possible to reduce the communication overhead of the proposed protocol to a constant value
because four parts of each ciphertext are needed for decryption. Therefore, C has four elements
in G for achieving the security level. From Table 4.2, we can observe that the communication
overhead of our protocol is slightly more than the other protocols [98], [92]. This degradation is
forgivable considering the fact that the proposed protocol has the lowest computational cost. It
also achieved signature and encryption in one logical step along with key escrow resilience.
Table 4.2: Computational and communication overhead analysis
Scheme Computational Cost Communication Overhead
Zhang [98] 22t1 + 3t2 + 5tp |G|+ |m|
Qin [68] 30t1 + 12t2 + 22tp 4|G|+ |GT |+ |m|
Wang [92] 17t1 + 7t2 + 8tp |G|+ |m|
Our protocol 7t1 + t2 + 9tp 4|G|+ |m|
4.5.3 KGC Overhead
We take the KGC overhead into account in computing and issuing key updates. In particular,
KGC broadcasts key update DIDt in each time period T ; therefore, by using a binary tree data
structure, the size of DIDt can be much smaller and logarithmically increased in the number
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of users n. To be more precise, KGC just needs to send key updates DIDt to certain ancestor
nodes who link to the unrevoked leaf nodes. For example, KGC broadcasts key updates to a set
of nodes (i.e., x2, x7, x12) at time period rather than of sending each leaf node separately (i.e.,
x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x14, x15) as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Consequently, the proposed protocol
improves KGC’s efficiency at the stage of distributing key updates and thus achieves efficient
revocation.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose an efficient revocable privacy-preserving protocol for enhancing se-
curity in FVCS. Furthermore, user revocation and batch verification are provided in the proposed
protocol. Also, the proposed protocol fulfills the security requirements such as confidentiality,
integrity and key escrow resilience. Through extensive performance evaluation, we have demon-
strated that the proposed protocol can fulfill much better efficiency than counterparts.
4.7 Limitation
Most security and privacy schemes have limitations and ours was no exception. The proposed
system is not intended to be used for malicious node detection. Since malicious node detection is
a well-studied problem in the literature [65], [37], we do not discuss the design of the detection
system itself. Therefore, the major concentration is how to provide a promising and efficient
mechanism to help achieve a significant security objective, which is compromised node revoca-
tion with respect to CL-PKC. In this work, we assume that the malicious user has already been
detected by the system (e.g., KGC). Then, the proposed protocol has tackled this security and
privacy issue by revoking the existed malicious user from the system.
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Chapter 5
Efficient Deduplicated Reporting in
Fog-Assisted Vehicular Crowdsensing
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters (e.g. Chapters 3 and 4) introduced a security architecture, including secure
and efficient privacy-preserving protocols in FVCS. The ultimate goal of an FVCS framework is
to provide a secure and promising environment to apply safety/non-safety related applications to
improve road safety and facilitate traffic management for the community. Nevertheless, gener-
ating crowdsensing reports at the same location may result in some duplication in these reports
leading to vast communication bandwidth and storage resources for RSUs. Furthermore, han-
dling this concern with a semi-trusted node brings another security and privacy challenge. This
chapter addresses these challenges from a different perspective by allowing semi-trusted RSUs
to perform secure computations by finding duplicated data on crowdsensing reports before RSUs
provide them to an organization.
Since modern vehicles are equipped with mobile sensors and OBUs, vehicles are able to
provide driving information and report on road conditions such as potholes, bumps, and slip-
periness. Thus, the deployment of distributed fog nodes improves the accuracy and efficiency
of road quality and safety since the fog nodes are located at the edge of the network and close
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to the vehicles. The goal of these vehicles is to share their resources based on task specifica-
tion requirements such as sensing areas (e.g., downtown or school areas). As an example, when
organizations (such as municipalities or insurance companies) need to know information about
possible traffic congestion in the downtown area, they ask RSUs as fog nodes [91] to recruit the
relevant vehicles that are on duty to assess.
Specifically, vehicles need to collect data from a required location and then outsource the
crowdsensing reports to an organization. However, some duplication in these crowdsensing re-
ports is bound to occur [63]. This challenge results in massive communication bandwidth and
storage resources for RSUs. As a result, RSUs provide a promising approach by discarding re-
dundant copies and only need one copy from every set of identical reports. For instance, suppose
that there are a specific number of vehicles generating the same crowdsensing reports from the
downtown area, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. In this scenario, the RSU should detect the replicated
reports generated from the same location in order to reduce the burden on its computations and
storage. Furthermore, this approach helps to improve efficiency by only having one report from
a collection of identical reports in the same position. This approach also saves bandwidth cost.
However, selecting one copy from the set of reduplicate reports and deleting the rest does not
guarantee fairness among participating vehicles. Therefore, the contributions of the participating
vehicles should be taken into account.
Nevertheless, RSUs are considered as semi-trusted nodes which may be curious about the
contents of crowdsensing reports. Detecting repeated reports by RSUs may incur potential pri-
vacy disclosure. Thus, participating vehicles have definite concerns about their private informa-
tion. In order to ensure that they are free from security risks and privacy threats, we utilize a
promising cryptographic signcryption mechanism to prevent private information of the partici-
pating vehicles from being disclosed, and fulfill data confidentiality, integrity and authentication
in one logical step. In our previous work [11], we designed a CLASC scheme to achieve security
requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, anonymity and key escrow
resilience. However, this solution brings a critical challenge to the RSUs in detecting reduplicate
ciphertext. As a result, vehicles attempt to outsource encrypted crowdsensing reports while sup-
porting deduplication techniques such as convergent encryption (CE) [26], the concept of which
we adopt in this work.













Figure 5.1: Crowdsensing reports formulation
order to successfully address the aforementioned challenges. A thorough search of the relevant
literature suggests that the proposed scheme is the first privacy-preserving scheme that supports
secure data deduplication mechanism based on the CLASC scheme, while no existing work
considers secure deduplication based on CL-PKC. The proposed scheme is resilient to malicious
semi-trusted RSUs, finds repeated reports and preserves the privacy at the same time. The main
contributions are as follows:
• We propose a privacy-preserving data deduplication scheme in order to improve security
and privacy for FVCS [9].
• We design a secure deduplication mechanism that is capable to perform safe computation
and find replicated reports via a semi trusted RSU.
• We integrate a homomorphic concept with a CLASC scheme [11] in order to preserve
the crowdsensing reports from being disclosed. Specifically, RSUs are able to select one
copy from a set of detected signcrypted reduplicated reports and delete the rest without
accessing any information about the reports.
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• The proposed scheme also achieves fairness between vehicles whose reports are redupli-
cated and deleted.
• The proposed scheme demonstrates secure data deduplication property and efficiency in
terms of computational cost, communication overhead and bandwidth overhead.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the system models
and design goals are presented followed by the preliminaries in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4,
the proposed deduplicated reporting scheme is presented in detail. Security analysis is given in
Section 5.5. Performance evaluation is analyzed in Section 5.6. A summary of the chapter is
presented in Section 5.7 while the limitation of this chapter is discussed in Section 5.8.
5.2 System Models and Design Goals
In this section, we present the system model, threat model and design goals.
A. System Model
As shown in Figure 5.2, the system model consists of key generation center (KGC), organi-
zations, crowdsourcing server (CS), RSUs as fog nodes and vehicles.
• Organizations release their spatial tasks to CS in order to collect crowdsensing reports.
Based on the task information, CS then assigns these tasks to the fog nodes (RSUs),
who are deployed at the edge of the network and close to the users.
• RSUs are powered with computational capabilities and storage spaces for providing
computation and storage services. They are in charge to recruit a set of vehicles to per-
form spatial tasks. They also perform data deduplication on the crowdsensing reports
submitted by vehicles and forward deduplicated reports to the CS and organizations.
In this system model, the RSU is considered as a semi-trusted component.
• Vehicles utilize their own on-board sensors and OBUs that are capable of data sensing,























Figure 5.2: System model
B. Threat Model
In this threat model, we assume vehicles are fully-trusted to submit crowdsensing reports
for benefits. We focus our attention on the threat to fog nodes (e.g., RSUs) that are con-
sidered as semi-trusted. RSUs are regarded as honest in faithfully following the proposed
scheme to identify deduplication, but they may be curious regarding the vehicles private in-
formation, therefore launch passive attacks. Specifically, RSUs may strive to know sensitive
crowdsensing information for a specific vehicle, e.g., location. We also take into account the
scenario where malicious RSUs can transmit forged reports to an organization by making
them evaluate in a certain way. Furthermore, external attackers may eavesdrop on wireless
communication channels to capture the information exchanged between entities vehicles,
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RSUs, CSs and organizations. In addition, the KGC cannot be fully trusted because it may
be managed by a commercial organization. As a result, it may access users private informa-
tion and disclose their crowdsensing reports as well.
C. Design Goals
We aim to achieve the following security objectives based on the system model and potential
threats. Our proposed CLASC [11] has achieved security requirements such as data confi-
dentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, anonymity, and key escrow resilience. Motivated
by the problem statement described, our design goal is to develop an efficient deduplicated
reporting scheme in FVCS, which can achieve the secure data deduplication requirement.
This technique provides efficient and secure ways to reduce the storage, bandwidth, and
computation overhead of the RSU, CS and organizations. In particular, the RSU is able
to detect reduplicated crowdsensing reports and delete them without learning any informa-
tion about the reports. For example, the RSU only needs one copy of the repeated reports,
which the remainder of them can be deleted. The contributions of the vehicles who submit
the repeated reports should be recorded in order to fulfill vehicles’ fairness. Consequently,
the RSU aggregates the signatures on the identical crowdsensing reports generated by dif-
ferent vehicles in order to simultaneously achieve fairness and minimize storage costs and
communication overhead.
5.3 Preliminaries
This section starts with basic concepts and presents the necessary complexity assumptions of the
proposed scheme.
A. Bilinear Maps.
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with the generator g of large prime order q, and GT be
another cyclic multiplicative group of the same large prime order q. An admissible bilinear
pairing ê : G × G→ GT is a map with the following properties.
• Bilinearity. For all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have ê(ua, vb) = ê(u, v)ab .
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• Non-degeneracy. ê(g, g1)6=1GT where 1GT denotes the identity element of group G.
• Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(g, g1) for g,g1 ∈ G. ê
: G× G→ GT is an admissible bilinear pairing.
B. Complexity Assumptions.
We recall the following intractability assumptions related to the security of our scheme.
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem): Given a tuple (g, ga, gb) ∈ G
for some a, b ∈ Z∗q , the CDH problem in G is to compute the element gab.
Definition 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH): Given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G
for some a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and x ∈ GT , the DBDH problem is to decide whether x holds ê(g, g)abc
or not.
5.4 Proposed Privacy-Preserving Data Deduplication Scheme
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme, which consists of four steps: system setup,
reports collection and sending, reports deduplication, and reports receiving.
1. System Setup
All participants including vehicle, RSU, CS and organization register with the KGC to
generate their public and full private keys. Given the security parameter k, this phase is
performed by the KGC as follows:
• Selects a cyclic multiplicative group G with the generator g of large prime order q,
and GT be another cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q and a bilinear map
ê : G × G→ GT .
• Chooses a random master secret key s ∈ Z∗q and a random arbitrary generator g ∈ G.
It also computes its master public key Ppub = gs.
• Chooses three secure hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : GT → G and H3 : Z∗q
→ G.
76
• Publishes the system parameter params = (G,GT , ê, g, q, Ppub, H1, H2, H3) and the
master secret key s will be kept secure.
In order to accomplish the key generation phase, a vehicle with identity Ui can randomly
choose xi ∈ Z∗q as its secret value and compute its public key PKi = gxi . Then, Ui sends
its identity and public key (Ui, PKi) to the KGC for registration. To achieve the identity
privacy, KGC computes Qi= H1(Ui) as its pseudo identity. Furthermore, the KGC then
computes the partial private key Di = Qsi that is sent to the corresponding user Qi via a
secure channel. Finally, Qi receives the partial private key Di. Thus, its full private key is
(Di, xi).
Likewise, all participants are provided the key pair as follows:
• RSU with the identityQRSU = H1(IDRSU ) has its public key PKRSU and full private
key (DRSU , xRSU).
• CS with the identity QCS = H1(IDCS) has its public key PKCS and full private key
(DCS, xCS).
• Organization with the identity Qorg = H1(IDorg) has its public key PKorg and full
private key (Dorg, xorg).
2. Reports Collection and Sending
The organizations release their spatial tasks on a CS that then provides them for vehicles
through RSU as a fog node. When vehicle Qi receives the task T with a unique identi-
fier N ∈ Z∗q , Qi starts to sense the data m ∈ Z∗q from the environment according to the
requirements of the T . As a result, Qi then generates a CrowdSensing Report CSRi. In
order to protect the CSRi from being disclosed and achieve confidentiality, integrity and
authenticity in one logical step, Qi signcrypts m and performs the following steps:
• Randomly selects ri ∈ Z∗q and computes the following,
• Ci = gri .
• Ki = ê(Ppub, Qriorg).
• Xi = H2(Ki).
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• Li = H3(m)ri .
• Pi = PKriorg.
• ENCi = mXi · Pi.
• ha = (Qorg ‖ PKorg ‖ Ci ‖ ENCi).
• αi = Di · hari · ENCxii .
• Ui sets CSRi = (N,Ci, Li, ENCi, αi) and forwards it to the fog node QRSU .
It is worth pointing out that we have used the concept of CE by considering that Li is
derived from the report data m to support the reduplicate data detection and deletion in the
ciphertext CSRi. In the phase, Ci and Li are used to detect the duplication of (CSR)ni=1.
Therefore, the fog node RSU QRSU can identify the reduplicate data based on Ci and Li
in the ciphertext CSRi.
3. Reports Deduplication
In this phase, RSU is able to detect the reduplicate data while CSRi is signcrypted. In this
application scenario, RSU is a semi-trusted node that may bring security and privacy issues
to participating vehicles. As a result, RSU performs homomorphic calculations on the
ciphertext to address these concerns. After RSU receives CSRi = (N,Ci, Li, ENCi, αi)
from Qi, it performs the following:
• Checks if the reduplicate data exists or not in the crowdsensing reports (CSRi)ni=1.
• Checks the condition
ê(Ci, Lj) = ê(Cj, Li)
• If it is fulfilled, therefore user i’s report CSRi is identical to user j’s report CSRj .
• RSU sorts the identical reports {CSRi}ki=1, where k ⊆ n and is the set of indices of
reduplicate reports.
• In order to achieve fairness among vehicles and record all the contributors, RSU
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Figure 5.3: Discarding redundant copies
• As illustrated in Figure 5.3, RSU randomly chooses one copyCSR′ = (N,Ci, ENCi, sigagg),
where i ∈ k.
• RSU also sets the other reports that are not reduplicated with others as CSRw =
(N,Cw, ENCw, αw), where w ∈ n and w 6∈ k.
• RSU then forwards the deduplicated reports (CSR′, (CSRw)nw=16∈k) to the CS who
will forward it to the organization Qorg.
4. Reports Receiving
The organization receives the deduplicated reports from the CS. In order to verify the
signature aggregation sigagg and check the contributors for CSR′, Qorg computes ha =












When the signature verification outputs true, Qorg decrypts the deduplicated report CSR′
as follows:
• Computes Korg = ê(Dorg, Ci).
• Computes Porg = (Ci)xorg .
• Computes Yorg = H2(Korg).
• Qorg then accesses the report by computing m′ = ENCi / Yorg · Porg.
• Likewise, Qorg can also unsigncrypt other deduplaicated reports (CSRw)nw=16∈k. Fi-
nally, Qorg obtains the reports and distributes the rewards to vehicles based on their
contributions.
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The correctness of the dedupliaction is as follows
ê(Ci, Lj) = ê(g
ri , H3(m)
rj)




In this section, the proposed scheme is analyzed and shows the achievement of the design goals
described in Section 5.2. In the considered system model, RSU as a fog node is capable to per-
form data deduplication without disclosing any information about the crowdsensing reports. In
order to support data deduplication property in the crowdsensing reports, the concept of CE is
used in the CSRi as described in the reports collection and sending phase. To achieve data
confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, anonymity, and key escrow resilience in the
CSRi, we implement our proposed CLASC scheme. Once RSU receives ciphertexts (CSRi)ni=1
from vehicles, it can identify whether two reports are identical or not by comparing their ci-
phertexts. Specifically, the RSU checks duplicates by running reports’ deduplication algorithm
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ê(Ci, Lj) = ê(Cj, Li) between two ciphertexts. RSU can determine the reduplicate data based
on Ci and Li tags in the ciphertext CSRi. After the RSU performs homomorphic calculations
and runs the reports deduplication algorithm to detect reduplicate reports, it keeps one copy of
them to achieve deduplication property and address vehicles’ privacy concerns simultaneously.
In order to save the storage and bandwidth in the organization side, it only needs to decrypt the
deduplicated reports by its private key (Dorg, xorg) to follow the CLASC scheme correctly to ob-
tain these reports. Specifically, the convergent item Li is not needed to use for decryption by the
organization such as insurance company due to the RSU being the only component who needs Li
to perform server side secure deduplication and insure performing secure deduplication without
learning the information. The organization only concerns about the signature verification and
report decryption. We utilize signature aggregation technique to help record all the contributions
of identical reports by vehicles (Qi)ki=1. αi generated on CSRi, such that Qorg is able to verify
αi and check out whether Qi is the contributor of CSRi or not.
In particular, when vehicles (Qi)ki=1 sense and generate the same report CSRi, QRSU ag-
gregates the corresponding signatures αi ∈ k. Therefore, deduplication technique improves the
communication overhead by reducing the bandwidth from QRSU to Qorg. Obviously, Qorg can
perform verification of the signatures αi ∈ k with corresponding public keys of vehicles (Qi)ki=1.
On the basis of CLASC scheme [11], the proposed scheme achieves confidentiality and unforge-
ability under CDH and DBDH assumptions. Therefore, the adversary cannot forge the signatures
or claim the contributions.
5.6 Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we count the number of cryptographic
operations, including the exponentiation inG and pairing. These operations dominate the compu-
tational cost of the algorithms and are considered in the time consumption. The other operations
such as the hash and multiplication in G are negligible and not time consuming. We denote texpG
the consumption of the exponentiation in G and tp the consumption of pairing. To quantify the
running time of the cryptographic operations in the proposed scheme, the pairing-based cryp-
tography (PBC) library ver.0.4.18 [52] is used and the implementation of the algorithms was
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executed on a 3.2 Ghz Pentium IV machine [81]. The running time are texpG = 6.4 ms and tp =
5.9 ms. The cryptographic operations and the run time of each phase in the proposed scheme are
illustrated in Table 5.1. The pairing is utilized to realize the bilinear pairing operation and the
elliptic curve is defined as y2 = x3 + x over a base field size of 512 bits. To ensure the security
of the proposed scheme, the parameter q is approximately 160 bits.
Table 5.1: Computational cost of the proposed scheme
Phases Operations Run time (ms)
System setup 3texpG 19.2
Report collection and sending 6texpG + tp 44.3
Report deduplication 2tp 11.8
Report receiving texpG + 5tp 35.9
In the proposed scheme, the communication overhead is analyzed among vehicles, RSUs,
CSs and organizations in terms of the lenght of ciphertext. We first consider the communication
between vehicles to RSU, where vehicles generate their crowdsensing reports and deliver them
to the local RSU. The report is in the form CSRi = (N,Ci, Li, ENCi, αi) for vehicles (Qi)ni=1,
who need to forward 1664 bits. Notably, the parameter q is set to be 160 bits. RSU with identity
QRSU receives (CSRi)ni=1 from (Qi)
n
i=1 and performs the data deduplication. If the reduplicate
data exists, it sorts the identical reports {CSRi}ki=1, where k is the number of reduplicate reports
in (CSRi)ni=1, and randomly chooses one copy from k. Then, we consider the communication of
both RSU, CS and organization. Eventually, RSU forwards only one copy 1504 bits for the set
of identical reports k. In case there is no reduplicate crowdsensing reports, the communication
overhead between RSU, CS and organization is 1504 bits for each report in (CSRw)nw=1. Con-
sequently, these binary lengths represent the ciphertext (CSR′, (CSRw)nw=16∈k). Then, the CS
receives this ciphertext and sends it to the organization Qorg. Also, we compare the communica-
tion overhead with an existing deduplication scheme in cloud server side [99], which consumes
2|GT | + 2|Z∗q | to find data deduplication, where |GT | and |Z∗q | denote the size of the elements
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Figure 5.4: Bandwidth overhead
We also take into account the bandwidth overhead in terms of the total size of crowdsensing
reports between RSU, CS and organization. In fact, when the number of vehicles increases, the
chance of existing identical data in the crowdsensing reports is highly possible and may increase
as well. In our experiment, we compare with a scheme that does not provide deduplication mech-
anism as shown in Figure 5.4. We consider that there are 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% of identical
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data detected in the reports with the number of vehicles 50, 100, 150 and 200 respectively. As
illustrated in Figure 5.4 (a), RSU utilizes the ordinary way to send all the generated reports in-
cluding similar reports. The RSU thus incurs a high cost for report size to process and forward.
For example, in Figure 5.4 (a), RSU sends 37.5 kilobyte (KB) of reports size with 200 vehicles.
On the other hand, we implement the deduplication technique in this experiment and show that
the RSU only sends one copy of reduplicated reports and the other dissimilar reports. Specifi-
cally, RSU sends 7.6 KB of reports size with 200 vehicles as shown in Figure 5.4 (b). We can
deduce that the bandwidth overhead of the proposed scheme remains efficient even if the number
of vehicles increases, e.g., in Figure 5.4 (a) we observe RSU processes 9.4 KB generated from 50
vehicles while in the proposed scheme RSU processes 7.6 KB generated from 200 vehicles. In
particular, Figure 5.5 illustrates how the proposed scheme can tackle the scalability concern and
evidently has lowest computational than the traditional way that does not provide deduplication
technique. From the above analysis, the proposed scheme is indeed efficient in terms of compu-





























Without deduplication technique With deduplication technique
Figure 5.5: Communication overhead comparison
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5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a deduplicated reporting scheme for reducing the communication
overhead between fog nodes, CS and organizations. Moreover, the proposed scheme provides
a homomorphic technique to insure the performance of a secure computation by a semi-trusted
RSU. Specifically, the RSU is able to detect reduplicated data in crowdsensing reports and delete
any repeated copies without accessing any information about the reports’ contents. Furthermore,
fairness is achieved between the vehicles whose reports are reduplicated and deleted. Thus,
the proposed scheme fulfills security requirements including secure data deduplication, confi-
dentiality, integrity, anonymity, mutual authentication and key escrow resilience. This chapter
elaborates on the properties of our proposed scheme and demonstrates its efficiency in terms of
computational cost, communication and bandwidth overhead.
5.8 Limitation
While we strove to provide a secure environment to insure users can join and participate our
system, the proposed privacy-preserving scheme limits to meet a certain privacy scenario. For
example, distributing rewards to the participating vehicles when sharing their resources may be
unfair. Specifically, a lazy vehicle can submit a crowdsensing report that is received from the
neighbor vehicle. In this work, we don’t discuss the incentive techniques that may use to address
such kinds of these privacy issues. To be more specific, the major concentration is to discuss
and address a promising security and privacy problem representing in a semi-trusted node who
is in charge to perform computations on sensitive information. Furthermore, the work’s scope is
also to solve another efficiency challenge where vehicles generate repeated crowdsensing reports
from the same location.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, the contributions of this dissertation are concluded and the future work is intro-
duced as well.
6.1 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis are mainly in threefold:
• First, a novel fog-assisted vehicular crowdsensing (FVCS) framework is proposed for im-
proving the efficiency and accuracy of the road condition monitoring system that results
in road quality and safety. Specifically, all the reports generated by vehicles are pro-
cessed near the end user rather than being processed in the centralized cloud. Therefore,
the proposed framework is suitable for the real-time VCS applications. Furthermore, a
novel privacy-preserving protocol is designed for enhancing security in the FVCS [11]
in order to protect vehicles privacy from being disclosed during a report formulation and
generation. Initially, we propose a highly efficient certificateless aggregate signcryption
(CLASC) scheme. On the basis of the CLASC scheme, a privacy-preserving protocol for
monitoring road surface conditions is designed. The proposed protocol combines CL-PKC
and signcryption technique in order to protect the vehicles privacy from being disclosed
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during generating reports. The proposed scheme is significantly more efficient than the
existing schemes [31], [51] in terms of computational costs and communication overhead.
• Second, an efficient revocable privacy-preserving protocol in FVCS is designed in order
to let the system revoke the compromised users [10]. The revocation technique is imple-
mented to address the issues when a private key of a participated user is being compromised
after it is detected as malicious. The proposed protocol makes use of a combination of a
binary tree structure with a certificateless signcryption technique to achieve compromised
user revocation that results in preserving road condition reports generated by vehicles from
being disclosed. It also protects these reports that are processed by compromised RSUs
from accessing and revealing them. Extensive simulations demonstrate efficiency with
regard to computational cost and ciphertext size of the proposed protocol. In terms of scal-
ability, user revocation, signature verification process and key escrow problem evasion, the
proposed protocol outperforms existing competing schemes [98], [68], [92].
• Finally, due to the fact that there are inevitably some duplicates in the crowdsensing reports
generated by vehicles at the same location, and that gateways as RSUs may be corrupted,
an efficient deduplicated reporting scheme in FVCS is proposed [9] in order to address
these challenges. A homomorphic concept with a signcryption technique is integrated to
let semi-trusted gateways process and analyze the encrypted crowdsensing reports. The
proposed scheme also supports deduplication process on the reports without revealing the
sensitive information of the participating vehicles. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is
much more efficient and guarantees fairness between vehicles whose reports are redupli-
cated and deleted. The simulation results show the efficiency of the proposed scheme in
terms of both communication and computational overheads. The proposed scheme also
demonstrates the achievement of secure data deduplication property.
6.2 Future Work
Future work will endeavor to advance the developed framework into a real-life situation by build-
ing FVCS applications in collaboration with the automobile industry. Furthermore, the following
research topics require further investigation as continuation of the current Ph.D. study.
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6.2.1 Differential Privacy in Fog-Assisted Vehicular Crowdsensing
The ability to collect data from modern connected vehicles presents opportunities for increased
analysis, which enables vehicle manufacturers to both improve existing work and develop new
services. For example, investigating driving behaviour would make it possible to learn more
about the drivers’ needs and preferences, allowing manufacturers to better cater to customers’
needs.
However, gathering data from vehicles is not only an opportunity for further analysis, but
also a possible privacy risk to the individual drivers. A recent survey shows that drivers privacy
concerns include disclosure of private information, vehicle tracking and commercial use of their
personal data. Therefore, privacy is a concern for drivers when it comes to connected vehicles.
Thus, the problem needs to be addressed by the manufacturers in order to maintain the drivers
trust.
While there is no general solution or scheme for a wide variety of many privacy issues in VCS
and how we should properly address them using different techniques, we plan to study differen-
tial privacy as a promising technique. Unlike other types of privacy models, differential privacy
might be applied to statistical databases for VCS in order to preserve drivers’ data privacy. Also,
it is able to provide high accuracy and privacy in many cases.
6.2.2 A Fog-Assisted Vehicular Crowdsensing Framework: A Technology
Management Perspective
Although a fog-assisted vehicular crowdsensing (FVCS) framework potentially provides major
advances in the field of vehicular crowdsensing, there is an urgent need for understanding the
business-related aspects surrounding FVCS technology. One of the design goals is to propose a
competitive product that outperforms its competitors. Thus, in order to facilitate achieving this
objective, a business perspective is also taken into account in terms of: technology management
and its importance; strategic analysis; technology recommendations; technology forecasting;
cost-efficient FVCS deployment; and stakeholders.
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6.2.2.1 Technology Management
Basically, technology management refers to the set of policies and practices that leverage tech-
nologies to build, maintain, and enhance competitive advantage [20]. Managing technology
within an organization is extremely important in order to maximize profits and gain an edge
over the competition. In specific terms, planning, designing, optimizing, and operating and
controlling technology are the fundamentals phases for technology management, which aims at
maximizing the cost effectiveness of investments in technology development that contributes to
the value of an organization. As an example, if an organization fails to plan for its technology,
it may encounter issues such as data loss or misuse of that technology. In contrast, the output
for this organization will increase if it creates a framework and plans for its technology. Indeed,
an important initial phase of technology management is how strategic analysis of the proposed
technology is conducted.
6.2.2.2 Strategic analysis
This subsection focuses on the potential of FVCS by conducting a SWOT analysis as well as
Porter’s five forces analysis. Both of these tools are commonly used by companies to conduct
analyses and to make strategic decisions. Each of the models seeks to define the company’s
position in the market. The major distinction is that Porter’s five forces model is used to analyze
the competitive environment within an industry and focus on external forces, while a SWOT
analysis tends to look more deeply within an organization to analyze its internal potential.
i. SWOT Analysis. The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of FVCS are de-
scribed as follows:
• Strengths. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, fog computing fills the
gap between the cloud network and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. As such, fog
computing enables end-user IoT devices to have computing, storage, networking and
communications functions. This promising paradigm solves the bandwidth, latency
and communications challenges associated with the next generation networks that will
utilize IoT, 5G and artificial intelligence devices. Significantly, fog computing, which
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is emerging as a powerful architecture for extending cloud network services to the net-
work edge, provides a business with the strengths to build the necessary architecture.
Fog computing adds immediate value to a business by enabling the acceleration of
rollout cycles, reducing costs, and broadening revenue bases. By solving bandwidth,
latency and communications challenges, fog computing makes the production of rev-
enue generating products and services more efficient and thus more cost-effective. In
addition, the shred-and-spread nature of fog architecture means that the business also
runs more efficiently and cost-effectively. Because the architecture shreds across de-
vices and spreads across clouds, fog computing provides highly functioning internal
business services while expanding the overall scalability of the business. Furthermore,
IoT and fog computing paradigms bring the advantage of new revenue streams. Thus,
fog computing will promote the development of long-awaited revenue-generating ap-
plications and services because fog creates value for IoT. An additional strength lies
in the leverage of current information technology (IT) investments. Because fog pro-
vides cloud-to-IoT attributes, it augments business investment in cloud networking
and enables future efficient, cost-effective, and constructive use of IoT server technol-
ogy. Fog architecture is designed to grow wherever the IoT market grows. Routers,
switches, application servers and storage servers will converge into fog nodes where
each fog node will be capable of providing a common hardware and software platform
that supports computing, networking, and storage.
• Weaknesses. There are some concerns that need to be addressed before fog computing
can be accepted as a viable choice in business computing. Organizations will be justi-
fiably wary of the loss of physical control of the data that is put on fog nodes. This is
due to the fact that the fog computing concept enables developers to access the most
important IoT data from different locations. However, it still keeps a significant vol-
ume of less important information in local storage. Furthermore, some organizations
are reluctant to have data leave their premises. In particular, fog computing provides
the property whereby a considerable amount of data is stored on the devices them-
selves (which are often located outside of organizations’ buildings). Thus, this may be
perceived as a risk for some developer communities.
• Opportunities. Fog computing will enable new and potentially highly disruptive busi-
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ness models for computing and networking. It is already influencing how edge net-
works are being built. Specifically, routers, switches, application servers, and storage
servers will converge into fog nodes. Such a transformation can significantly reshape
the networking, server, and software industry landscape, which as a result often fea-
tures a unified networking platform that supports heterogeneous networking technolo-
gies, and a common computing platform that supports applications from multiple sup-
pliers. This ongoing convergence of computing, networking and storage at the edge
will significantly reduce system complexity and cost, increase system and application
manageability, and make it easier for applications to interact with each other. In addi-
tion, Fog-as-a-Service (FaaS) will enable new business models to deliver services to
customers. Unlike clouds that are mostly operated by large companies that can afford
to build and operate vast data centers, FaaS will enable companies, large and small, to
deliver private or public computing, storage, and control services on different scales
to meet the needs of a wide variety of customers.
• Threats. While we believe that many forward-looking organizations will see fog com-
puting as an opportunity to migrate to better computing practices that open up exciting
opportunities for IT, there will probably be many threats to their corporate IT culture
in terms of data security and privacy. Any business will focus its attention on these
threats in order to benefit from the services provided by edge paradigms. One of the
most important fog aspects is data security. As with any IoT project, the presence of
multiple weakly-secured devices connected to a network creates greater vulnerability
to cyber-attacks. An edge strategy can significantly strengthen a network by keeping
major threats away from its core. With this activity taking place between local end-
points, threats such as privacy disclosure or data breaches can be identified at an earlier
stage and contained at device level. Individual privacy can be increased by processing
person-specific data in the fog, rather than it being collected and stored in a centralized
database available to company staff.
ii. Porter’s Five Forces Analysis
One of the greatest challenges to any business is competition. In particular, a business
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should identify its competitors and how their actions in the marketplace are going to affect
the current bottom line and future planning. A useful analysis tool is the model devised by
Porter [66], which considers five distinct categories that help determine whether a business
can be profitable, based on other businesses in the industry. Thus, understanding competi-
tive forces, and their underlying causes, reveals the roots of an industry’s current profitabil-
ity while providing a framework for anticipating and influencing competition over time.
Porter regarded understanding both the competitive forces and the overall industry structure
as crucial for effective strategic decision-making. In Porter’s model, the five forces that
shape industry competition are described as follows:
• Competitive rivalry. This force examines the current level of competition intensity in
the marketplace, which is determined by the number of existing competitors and what
each is capable of doing. For example, if the existing competitors in mobile crowd-
sensing real-time systems, such as Google maps and Waze, are about to enter into
this framework, the proposed novel technology can tackle intense rivalry among them.
Regardless, the proposed product can serve better and more efficiently in terms of
fog-assisted vehicular crowdsensing real-time systems. Intense rivalry among existing
competitors can be managed by building a sustainable differentiation scale, creating
increased competitiveness and greater collaboration with competitors. Rather than just
competing within a small market, this will increase market size as well as challenge
intense rivalry among existing competitors.
• Bargaining power of suppliers. This force analyzes how much power a business’s
supplier has and how much control it has over the potential to raise its prices which, in
turn, would lower the business’s profitability. Building an efficient supply chain with
multiple suppliers, and developing dedicated suppliers whose business depends upon
the firm, will challenge the bargaining power of suppliers.
• Bargaining power of customers. This force looks at the power of the consumer to
affect pricing and quality. Consumers want to buy the best offerings available while
paying the minimum possible price. FVCS technology can tackle their bargaining
power by building a large customer base. This will help reduce the bargaining power
of customers and provide an opportunity for the firm to streamline its sales and pro-
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duction process. In addition, rapidly innovating new services help limit the bargaining
power of customers who often seek discounts and offerings on established services.
• Threat of new entrants. In the mobile and vehicular crowdsensing fields, new entrants,
who bring innovation at all levels, put pressure on the proposed FVCS technology
through applying a lower pricing strategy, reducing costs, and providing new value
propositions to customers. A business must manage all these challenges and build
effective barriers to safeguard its competitive edge. In order to address the threats of
new entrants, innovating new services can bring new customers and also give long-
standing customers a reason to buy new services.
• Threat of substitute products or services. This force studies how easy it is for con-
sumers to switch from a business’s product or service to that of a competitor. It con-
siders how many competitors there are, how their prices and quality compare to the
business being examined and how much profit those competitors are earning, which
would determine if they can lower their costs even more. Thus, firm profitability suf-
fers when a new product or service meets similar customer needs in different ways. By
being service-oriented, understanding the core need of the customer rather than what
the customer is buying and increasing the switching cost for them, FVCS can tackle
the threat of substitute products or services.
This present work proposes to extensively investigate these forces in existing competitive
mobile crowdsensing real-time systems, such as Google maps and Waze, compared to the
developed FVCS framework. After considering the aforementioned strategic analysis re-
garding the proposed framework, how it can be recommended to other firms is discussed.
6.2.2.3 Recommendations
A set of recommendations to help manage this technology and attract other businesses into the
developed technology is also considered and investigated. The focus of this present study is
on the proposed FVCS technology that will be needed to migrate to fog computing rather than
the existing cloud computing paradigm. In fact, businesses such as VCS applications handle
significantly large amounts of data on a regular basis [57]. As a result, cloud-based and fog-
based solutions were developed to streamline the data organization process and help businesses
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manage their data in real-time. Choosing which model is best for a particular business depends
on the amount of data the business organizes and manages. Fog computing and cloud computing
are both excellent models for data storage, management and analytics. However, many emerging
IoT applications that require services rather closer to the edge cannot wait for data to travel
all the way to the cloud and back [57]. Thus, cloud computing alone has become increasingly
inadequate for IoT applications. Furthermore, for a business that accumulates higher levels of
data, such as real-time road surface condition monitoring system (RSCMS) applications, as well
as the ability to maintain a strict budget and control scalability, fog computing will optimize the
data flow. Fog computing is ideal for businesses that regularly process large volumes of data as
well as those that handle sensitive data, such as those in the transportation agencies for detecting
road abnormalities. Indeed, in order to keep attracting other organizations, while increasing gain
and reducing loss, technology forecasting should be considered.
6.2.2.4 Technological Forecasting
Technology changes have been recently acknowledged as a critical factor in determining the
competitiveness of any organization [58]. In such an environment, accurate anticipation and fore-
cast of this factor has been of considerable importance for incorporating technological changes
into strategic planning processing [30]. Therefore, in order to monitor technology changes, an
efficient forecast of technology can help maximize gain and minimize future loss for the organi-
zation.
Technological forecasting (TF) is the process of predicting the future characteristics and tim-
ing of technology [33]. TF is aimed at predicting future technological capabilities, attributes, and
parameters. Forecasting a technology includes not only specific mechanical/physical hardware,
but also includes associated software such as procedures and methods for organizing human
activity, as well as the means for manipulating or engineering human behavior. Technology fore-
casting methods can be classified as exploratory and normative [15]. Exploratory technological
forecasting starts from today’s certain basis of knowledge and is oriented towards the future. By
contrast, normative technological forecasting focuses on the creation of alternative technologi-
cal paths to a desired, predefined end state and assesses issues such as future goals, needs, and
desires. In fact, many changes are currently taking place in different technologies such as soft-
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ware, computing and hardware. Thus, there is a need to find the trends and predict the future of
these technologies. Technology forecasting methods are useful in identifying these trends and
predicting the future of the proposed FVCS framework. This present work focuses on normative
technological forecasting since the proposed framework consists of two promising paradigms,
namely fog computing and vehicular crowdsensing, which will make a bright emergence in the
near future in the form of smart cities.
Normative methods are also known as goal-setting methods. Normative technological fore-
casting first estimates future goals, needs, and desires, and works backwards to the present. Such
methods are used to determine the level of functional capability that must be achieved to solve a
problem or overcome a difficulty. There are several types of normative technological forecasting
methods.
Firstly, the relevance trees method is an organized normative approach that starts with a par-
ticular objective and is used for forecasting as well as planning. The basic structure resembles
an organizational chart and presents information in a hierarchical structure. The principle behind
using the relevance tree is to systematically evaluate all the related technologies that would lead
to the success of the intended objective [58]. The relevance tree is a powerful and general tech-
nique with a wide range of applicability. It can be used for identifying new system alternatives
and can be a method for obtaining different solutions to a given problem. However, the relevance
tree for a large complex technology could become too complicated to handle.
Secondly, the Morphological Analysis (MA) method is a normative technique that provides
a framework for exploring all possible solutions to a particular problem. This type of analysis
involves the systematic study of the current and future scenarios of a particular problem. MA can
be used to identify the requirements for individual technologies of a specific system, but cannot
be used to obtain quantitative estimates of the relative importance of various technological goals.
For example, MA is normally carried out only for specific short-term planning purposes and
has not yet been applied to long-term forecasting. MA is a useful technique for encouraging
the thinking process and allows examination of all combinations of alternatives to achieve the
objective. Nevertheless, it is a static model and is not suited to manage systems that change with
time or to describe a logical sequence of events.
Although normative methods provide advantages such as the generation of a range of al-
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ternatives, cost effectiveness and simplicity of application, they suffer from certain drawbacks.
These drawbacks include: the decision variables and hierarchical structure of technology must
be known; the weights must be objective in nature; the time period is usually not clearly forecast;
and accuracy cannot be clearly defined. As a consequence, the aim of this present work is to de-
sign a suitable and efficient method that will enhance the performance of conventional normative
methods and determine the ideal configuration for the proposed FVCS framework.
6.2.2.5 Cost-Efficient FVCS Deployment
The previous subsections discuss technology management and forecasting for FVCS. Since busi-
nesses are more concerned about how to cost effectively deploy such technologies, this will be
further developed in future work. In particular, RSU is a key component of the VCS infras-
tructure connecting mobile vehicles and the rest of the infrastructure. Road surface condition
monitoring systems (RSCMS) is a large-scale application that RSUs should densely deploy in
order to maximize their availability and avoid the blind spots that may exist causing vehicles to
lose connection with the infrastructure. Nevertheless, the massive deployment of RSUs needed to
seamlessly cover the total area of interest can be very expensive. Motivated by this observation,
development of the present work will include the study of a new strategy to best deploy RSUs so
that their spatial and temporal coverage is maximized under a limited budget. Thus, the proper
distribution of RSUs is of great importance in improving the service quality of VCS applica-
tions. The system components that participate in the deployed technology should be determined
as system stakeholders.
6.2.2.6 Stakeholders
Chapter 2, Section 2.4 describes the infrastructure of a FVCS framework for a road surface
monitoring conditions system, and also shows how computing resources can be accessed from
a variety of organizations. The proposed technology is evidently beneficial to organizations,
such as insurance companies and municipalities, who seek access to transportation systems with
real-time applications.









• Consumers. In the RSCMS, the consumers (e.g., insurance companies and municipalities)
are effectively subscribers, who only purchase the use of the system from the providers on
an operational expense basis. Corporate users of fog computing have an active role to play
in ensuring that fog computing actually delivers on its promise to revolutionize corporate
computing, by liaising with industry groups as well as national and international regulators.
• Providers. Fog computing service providers, such as Cisco IOX, own and operate fog
computing systems in order to deliver services to third parties. They also provide RSUs as
fog devices and data services. The providers will perform the maintenance and upgrades
to the system of which the consumers were in charge when they owned the systems. The
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providers will also be responsible for maintaining the software used on the fog, along with
the pricing of the fog services.
• Customers. In the RSCMS, the customers are the vehicles that sense and generate the
crowdsensing reports in response to the announced tasks released by the organizations.
• Regulators. These are the public authorities or government agencies responsible for ex-
ercising autonomous authority over some area of human activity in a regulatory or su-
pervisory capacity. In the RSCMS, the regulator comprises the directives that safeguard
information technology and computer systems with the purpose of forcing companies and
organizations to protect their systems and information from cyber attacks.
Investigating a business perspective related to FVCS technology is a very significant step in
introducing a solid product into the real world. The specific focus of this present work is to
evaluate the proposed technology from different business aspects in order to provide a compet-
itive product that outperforms its competitors. These aspects include technology management,
strategic analysis, technology recommendations, technology forecasting, cost-efficient FVCS de-
ployment and stakeholders. Finally, future development of this present study will include further
extensive investigation of the business perspective in relation to the proposed technology as well
as to produce a successful product that will outperform its counterparts.
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certificateless cryptography. In International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography,
pages 508–524. Springer, 2006.
[23] Tech. Rep. Cisco. Cisco delivers vision of fog computing to acceler-
ate value from billions of connected devices. URL: http://www. cisco.
com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT IBSG 0411FINAL. pdf (ä : 5.02. 2016), Jan.
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Hubaux. Mix-zones for location privacy in vehicular networks. In ACM Workshop on
Wireless Networking for Intelligent Transportation Systems (WiN-ITS), number LCA-
CONF-2007-016, 2007.
[35] Raghu K Ganti, Fan Ye, and Hui Lei. Mobile crowdsensing: current state and future
challenges. IEEE Communications Magazine, 49(11), 2011.
[36] Mario Gerla. Vehicular cloud computing. In Ad Hoc Networking Workshop (Med-Hoc-
Net), 2012 The 11th Annual Mediterranean, pages 152–155. IEEE, 2012.
[37] Philippe Golle, Dan Greene, and Jessica Staddon. Detecting and correcting malicious
data in vanets. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Vehicular ad
hoc networks, pages 29–37. ACM, 2004.
[38] Jason J Haas, Yih-Chun Hu, and Kenneth P Laberteaux. Design and analysis of a
lightweight certificate revocation mechanism for vanet. In Proceedings of the sixth ACM
international workshop on VehiculAr InterNETworking, pages 89–98. ACM, 2009.
[39] Danny Harnik, Benny Pinkas, and Alexandra Shulman-Peleg. Side channels in cloud
services: Deduplication in cloud storage. IEEE Security & Privacy, 8(6):40–47, 2010.
[40] Bessie C Hu, Duncan S Wong, Zhenfeng Zhang, and Xiaotie Deng. Certificateless sig-
nature: a new security model and an improved generic construction. Designs, Codes and
Cryptography, 42(2):109–126, 2007.
[41] Xinyi Huang, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo, Duncan S Wong, and Wei Wu. Certificateless signature
revisited. In Proceedings of the Australasian Conference on Information Security and
Privacy, pages 308–322. Springer, 2007.
[42] Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srdjan Capkun, and Jun Luo. The security and privacy of smart
vehicles. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(3):49–55, 2004.
[43] Jayaprakash Kar. Provably secure identity-based aggregate signcryption scheme in ran-
dom oracles. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2013:37, 2013.
104
[44] Uichin Lee and Mario Gerla. A survey of urban vehicular sensing platforms. Computer
Networks, 54(4):527–544, 2010.
[45] Chun-Ta Li, Min-Shiang Hwang, and Yen-Ping Chu. A secure and efficient communica-
tion scheme with authenticated key establishment and privacy preserving for vehicular ad
hoc networks. Computer Communications, 31(12):2803–2814, 2008.
[46] Fagen Li, Masaaki Shirase, and Tsuyoshi Takagi. Certificateless hybrid signcryption. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Security Practice and Expe-
rience, pages 112–123. Springer, 2009.
[47] Benoı̂t Libert and Damien Vergnaud. Adaptive-id secure revocable identity-based en-
cryption. In Proceedings of the RSA Conference on Cryptographers Track, pages 1–15.
Springer, 2009.
[48] Xiaodong Lin, Rongxing Lu, Chenxi Zhang, Haojin Zhu, Pin-Han Ho, and Xuemin Shen.
Security in vehicular ad hoc networks. IEEE communications magazine, 46(4), 2008.
[49] Xiaodong Lin, Xiaoting Sun, Pin-Han Ho, and Xuemin Shen. Gsis: A secure and privacy-
preserving protocol for vehicular communications. IEEE Transactions on vehicular tech-
nology, 56(6):3442–3456, 2007.
[50] Thomas DC Little, Ashish Agarwal, et al. An information propagation scheme for vanets.
In Proc. IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems, pages 155–160, 2005.
[51] Haijun Lu and Qi Xie. An efficient certificateless aggregate signcryption scheme from
pairings. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronics, Communications
and Control (ICECC), pages 132–135. IEEE, 2011.
[52] Ben Lynn et al. The pairing-based cryptography library. Internet: crypto. stanford.
edu/pbc/[Mar. 27, 2013], 2006.
[53] Huadong Ma, Dong Zhao, and Peiyan Yuan. Opportunities in mobile crowd sensing. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 52(8):29–35, 2014.
105
[54] Barbara Mavı̀ Masini. Vehicular networking for mobile crowd sensing. Ad Hoc Networks,
36(P2):407–408, 2016.
[55] Artis Mednis, Atis Elsts, and Leo Selavo. Embedded solution for road condition monitor-
ing using vehicular sensor networks. In Proceedings of the 2012 6th International Confer-
ence on Application of Information and Communication Technologies (AICT), pages 1–5.
IEEE, 2012.
[56] Alfred J Menezes, Paul C Van Oorschot, and Scott A Vanstone. Handbook of applied
cryptography. CRC press, 1996.
[57] Daniele Miorandi, Sabrina Sicari, Francesco De Pellegrini, and Imrich Chlamtac. Internet
of things: Vision, applications and research challenges. Ad hoc networks, 10(7):1497–
1516, 2012.
[58] Somnath Mishra, SG Deshmukh, and Prem Vrat. Matching of technological forecasting
technique to a technology. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 69(1):1–27,
2002.
[59] Nathalie Mitton, Symeon Papavassiliou, Antonio Puliafito, and Kishor S Trivedi. Com-
bining cloud and sensors in a smart city environment, 2012.
[60] Atsuko Miyaji, Masaki Nakabayashi, and Shunzou Takano. New explicit conditions of
elliptic curve traces for fr-reduction. IEICE transactions on fundamentals of electronics,
communications and computer sciences, 84(5):1234–1243, 2001.
[61] Prashanth Mohan, Venkata N Padmanabhan, and Ramachandran Ramjee. Nericell: rich
monitoring of road and traffic conditions using mobile smartphones. In Proceedings of the
6th ACM conference on Embedded network sensor systems, pages 323–336. ACM, 2008.
[62] Michael Myers, Rich Ankney, Ambarish Malpani, Slava Galperin, and Carlisle Adams.
X. 509 internet public key infrastructure online certificate status protocol-ocsp. Technical
report, 1999.
106
[63] Jianbing Ni, Xiaodong Lin, Kuan Zhang, and Yong Yu. Secure and deduplicated spatial
crowdsourcing: A fog-based approach. In Proceedings of the Global Communications
Conference (GLOBECOM), 2016 IEEE, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2016.
[64] Mikko Perttunen, Oleksiy Mazhelis, Fengyu Cong, Mikko Kauppila, Teemu Leppänen,
Jouni Kantola, Jussi Collin, Susanna Pirttikangas, Janne Haverinen, Tapani Ristaniemi,
et al. Distributed road surface condition monitoring using mobile phones. In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing, pages 64–78.
Springer, 2011.
[65] WR Pires, Thiago H de Paula Figueiredo, Hao Chi Wong, and Antonio Alfredo Ferreira
Loureiro. Malicious node detection in wireless sensor networks. In Parallel and dis-
tributed processing symposium, 2004. Proceedings. 18th international, page 24. IEEE,
2004.
[66] Michael E Porter. How competitive forces shape strategy. In Readings in strategic man-
agement, pages 133–143. Springer, 1989.
[67] Layla Pournajaf, Li Xiong, Vaidy Sunderam, and Slawomir Goryczka. Spatial task as-
signment for crowd sensing with cloaked locations. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 15th
International Conference on Mobile Data Management (MDM), volume 1, pages 73–82.
IEEE, 2014.
[68] Bo Qin, Qianhong Wu, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, and Lei Zhang. Preserving security and
privacy in large-scale vanets. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Informa-
tion and Communications Security, pages 121–135. Springer, 2011.
[69] Maxim Raya and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Securing vehicular ad hoc networks. Journal of
Computer Security, 15(1):39–68, 2007.
[70] Maxim Raya, Daniel Jungels, Panos Papadimitratos, Imad Aad, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux.
Certificate revocation in vehicular networks. Laboratory for computer Communica-
tions and Applications (LCA) School of Computer and Communication Sciences, EPFL,
Switzerland, 2006.
107
[71] Ju Ren, Yaoxue Zhang, Kuan Zhang, and Xuemin Shen. Exploiting mobile crowdsourcing
for pervasive cloud services: challenges and solutions. IEEE Communications Magazine,
53(3):98–105, 2015.
[72] Ronald L Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. A method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21(2):120–126,
1978.
[73] Krishna Sampigethaya, Leping Huang, Mingyan Li, Radha Poovendran, Kanta Matsuura,
and Kaoru Sezaki. Caravan: Providing location privacy for vanet. Technical report, Wash-
ington Univ Seattle Dept Of Electrical Engineering, 2005.
[74] Mike Scott et al. Efficient implementation of cryptographic pairings. In Online].
http://www. pairing-conference. org/2007/invited/Scott slide. pdf, 2007.
[75] S Sharmila Deva Selvi, S Sree Vivek, J Shriram, S Kalaivani, and C Pandu Rangan. Iden-
tity based aggregate signcryption schemes. In Proceedings of the International Conference
on Cryptology in India, pages 378–397. Springer, 2009.
[76] Jae Hong Seo and Keita Emura. Revocable identity-based encryption revisited: Secu-
rity model and construction. In Public-Key Cryptography–PKC 2013, pages 216–234.
Springer, 2013.
[77] Seung-Hyun Seo, Mohamed Nabeel, Xiaoyu Ding, and Elisa Bertino. An efficient cer-
tificateless encryption for secure data sharing in public clouds. IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, 26(9):2107–2119, 2014.
[78] Adi Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In Workshop on the
theory and application of cryptographic techniques, pages 47–53. Springer, 1984.
[79] Ahmed Shawish and Maria Salama. Cloud computing: paradigms and technologies.
In Inter-cooperative collective intelligence: Techniques and applications, pages 39–67.
Springer, 2014.
[80] Limin Shen, Futai Zhang, and Yinxia Sun. Efficient revocable certificateless encryption
secure in the standard model. The computer journal, 57(4):592–601, 2014.
108
[81] Elaine Shi, John Bethencourt, TH Hubert Chan, Dawn Song, and Adrian Perrig. Multi-
dimensional range query over encrypted data. In Security and Privacy, 2007. SP’07. IEEE
Symposium on, pages 350–364. IEEE, 2007.
[82] Muhammad Shiraz, Abdullah Gani, Rashid Hafeez Khokhar, and Rajkumar Buyya. A re-
view on distributed application processing frameworks in smart mobile devices for mobile
cloud computing. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 15(3):1294–1313, 2013.
[83] William Stallings. Cryptography and network security: principles and practices. Pearson
Education India, 2006.
[84] Ivan Stojmenovic. Fog computing: A cloud to the ground support for smart things and
machine-to-machine networks. In Proceedings of the Telecommunication Networks and
Applications Conference (ATNAC), 2014 Australasian, pages 117–122. IEEE, 2014.
[85] Girts Strazdins, Artis Mednis, Georgijs Kanonirs, Reinholds Zviedris, and Leo Selavo.
Towards vehicular sensor networks with android smartphones for road surface monitor-
ing. In 2nd International Workshop on Networks of Cooperating Objects (CONET11),
Electronic Proceedings of CPS Week, volume 11, page 2015, 2011.
[86] Yinxia Sun, Futai Zhang, Limin Shen, and Robert H Deng. A revocable certificateless
signature scheme. JCP, 9(8):1843–1850, 2014.
[87] Maha Tebaa, Saı̈d El Hajji, and Abdellatif El Ghazi. Homomorphic encryption applied
to the cloud computing security. In Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering,
volume 1, pages 4–6, 2012.
[88] Hien To, Cyrus Shahabi, and Leyla Kazemi. A server-assigned spatial crowdsourcing
framework. ACM Transactions on Spatial Algorithms and Systems, 1(1):2, 2015.
[89] Ontario Ministry Transp. Winter driving be prepared, be safe. In
http://www.mto.gov.on.ca/english/ontario-511/pdfs/winter-safe-driving.pdf, 2017.
[90] Tung-Tso Tsai and Yuh-Min Tseng. Revocable certificateless public key encryption. IEEE
Systems Journal, 9(3):824–833, 2015.
109
[91] Luis M Vaquero and Luis Rodero-Merino. Finding your way in the fog: Towards a com-
prehensive definition of fog computing. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Re-
view, 44(5):27–32, 2014.
[92] Yimin Wang, Hong Zhong, Yan Xu, and Jie Cui. Ecpb: Efficient conditional privacy-
preserving authentication scheme supporting batch verification for vanets. IJ Network
Security, 18(2):374–382, 2016.
[93] Chenhuang Wu and Zhixiong Chen. A new efficient certificateless signcryption scheme.
In Information Science and Engineering, 2008. ISISE’08. International Symposium on,
volume 1, pages 661–664. IEEE, 2008.
[94] Tsu-Yang Wu, Tung-Tso Tsai, and Yuh-Min Tseng. A revocable id-based signcryption
scheme. Journal of Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, 3(3):240–251,
2012.
[95] Wenjian Xie and Zhang Zhang. Efficient and provably secure certificateless signcryption
from bilinear maps. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Conference on Wire-
less Communications, Networking and Information Security (WCNIS), pages 558–562.
IEEE, 2010.
[96] Wun-She Yap, Sherman SM Chow, Swee-Huay Heng, and Bok-Min Goi. Security me-
diated certificateless signatures. In Applied Cryptography and Network Security, pages
459–477. Springer, 2007.
[97] Chenxi Zhang, Xiaodong Lin, Rongxing Lu, and P-H Ho. Raise: An efficient rsu-aided
message authentication scheme in vehicular communication networks. In Proceedings of
the IEEE International Conference on Communications, pages 1451–1457. IEEE, 2008.
[98] Lei Zhang, Qianhong Wu, Agusti Solanas, and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. A scalable ro-
bust authentication protocol for secure vehicular communications. IEEE Transactions on
vehicular Technology, 59(4):1606–1617, 2010.
[99] Qingji Zheng and Shouhuai Xu. Secure and efficient proof of storage with deduplication.
In Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Data and Application Security and
Privacy, pages 1–12. ACM, 2012.
110
[100] Yuliang Zheng. Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost (signature & encryption)ł cost
(signature)+ cost (encryption). In Proceedings of the Annual International Cryptology
Conference, pages 165–179. Springer, 1997.
[101] Haojin Zhu, Xiaodong Lin, Rongxing Lu, P-H Ho, and Xuemin Shen. Aema: An aggre-
gated emergency message authentication scheme for enhancing the security of vehicular
ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the ICC’08. IEEE International Conference on Com-
munications, pages 1436–1440. IEEE, 2008.
111
